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THE SECOND AMENDMENT: THE HIGHEST STAGE OF
ORIGINALISM
JACK N. RAKOVE*
To someone who has observed the Second Amendment dispute
from a distance-aware of the main lines of engagement, but not fully
abreast of all the maneuvers-a sudden plunge into the struggle in the
trenches can be a sobering experience, especially when one
encounters the contingent who march under the banner of the self-
proclaimed "standard model" which argues that the Amendment
constitutionally protects a private, individual right to keep and bear
arms.1  There is something about the joie de combat of the
participants that unnerves the civilian observer. Assertions lacking
qualifications are propounded with utmost fervor and conviction, as if
a commander was hectoring his troops to smash the enemy line,
bypassing any obstacle encountered en route; victory is repeatedly
declared in self-congratulatory pronouncements even while the other
side is pausing to reload. Searching for the evidentiary authority on
which these assertions rest-that is, reading the footnotes -requires a
bewildering chase through the relevant manuals and orderly books,
the citations that student law review editors, the industrious sappers
of the legal academy, insist must be provided, but which often turn
out to be one secondary source supporting another with nary a
document in sight. An occasional warrior comes into view, with a
strange glint in his eye and a dramatic tale to tell.2 Turning the corner
in a trench, one encounters odd combatants who seem to have
* Coe Professor of History and American Studies, and Professor of Political Science,
Stanford University. I am grateful to Akhil Amar, Larry Kramer, and Robert Post for
necessary qualifications and proper criticisms, and to Michael Bellesiles, a card-carrying
member of the NRA, for general guidance.
1. Skeptical as I am of the view that this interpretation merits description as the standard
model, I will henceforth refer to it as the individual right interpretation.
2. Thus one is somewhat surprised to find Akhil Amar, a well-known textualist,
wondering whether, under a modern reading of the Second Amendment, "perhaps the people
must be 'armed' with modems more than muskets, with access to the Internet more than to the
shooting range," even though the use of these devices would seem to fall under the First
Amendment's freedom of press, assembly, and petition. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCrION 49 (1998). In the strange glint category, I would
also be inclined to place Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy,
Distribution, and the Right to Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257 (1991).
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enlisted on the wrong side; like politics sometimes, the Second
Amendment makes strange bunkmates.3 And the dehumanization of
the foe common in wartime carries over into scholarly expression, so
that one combatant comes to be identified in rebuttal not by the name
his loving parents gave him before sending him off to battle, but by
the title of his essay: Gun Crazy.4
In this charged atmosphere, odd misstatements of fact that one
encounters appear only as distracting ricochets. Opening one
standard statement of the individual right interpretation, one quickly
learns that "[t]he American Revolution was sparked at Lexington and
Concord, and in Virginia, by British attempts to disarm the individual
and hence the militia."5  Most historians, however, have labored
under the delusion that the Revolution arose from an unmanageable
dispute over the right of Parliament to make laws "in all cases
whatsoever" for the American colonies, and that the regulars who
marched out the future Route 2 did not go door to door looking for
weapons, but were instead intent on raiding a town where the
Provincial Congress had concentrated whatever arms and munitions
the colony was able to muster. But perhaps Stephen Halbrook only
wants to prepare us for a more startling discovery: that "[b]efore the
proposal of the Constitution, the newly independent colonies had
existed in a state of nature with each other, 6 which certainly would
have been news to the members of the Continental Congress, the
framers and ratifiers of the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual
Union, and most Americans who thought that the Declaration of
Independence was the work of the United States in Congress
3. See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
Those familiar with his other writings and teaching might indulge the suspicion that Levinson
sees his essay less as an endorsement of the individual right interpretation on its merits, and
more as a useful way to tweak the formal orthodoxies of contemporary law. In the realm of
strange bedmates, one might also cite Leonard Levy, whose chapter on the Second Amendment
in his recent synoptic book, Origins of the Bill of Rights (1999), endorses the individual right
interpretation while dismissing the conclusions it supports as "anachronistic" as they relate to
the militia and "feckless" in their invocation of the right of revolution. Id. at 149. Levy
provides no footnotes, however, and his barebones bibliography of eleven books (only one
published since 1990, and two since 1980) gives little guidance as to how he reached his
conclusions, or why he simply ignores the opposing position represented in this Symposium.
4. See Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second
Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139 passim (1996) (rebutting Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy:
Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV.
57 (1995)). One would not want to suggest, however, that Herz's essay is itself a model of
scholarly decorum.
5. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 7 (1984).
6. Id. at 65.
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assembled. The prolific Don Kates, Jr., reveals that James Monroe
was actually a Federalist,7 though historians previously thought that
he had opposed the Constitution; that Thomas Jefferson "played little
part in this debate from the remote vantage point of his position as
ambassador to France,"8 though the publication of his letter
endorsing the addition of a bill of rights to the Constitution was a
source of some concern, not to say anxiety, to his correspondent
James Madison; and that New Hampshire, the ninth and decisive
state to ratify the Constitution, was actually the first.9 Sometimes
historical figures simply acquire new names or titles. Thus in one
recent important essay, Albert Gallatin becomes a senator before he
even was elected to Congress; Senator William Grayson of Virginia
loses the second syllable of his last name even though his family never
passed through Ellis Island; and Tench Coxe, the loyalist eventually
turned Jeffersonian, becomes Trench, giving his pronouncements on
firearms new authority. 0 The individual right interpretation has also
been a boon to the literary reputation of Richard Henry Lee, who is
repeatedly restored to his wrongful place as the reputed author of the
Letters from the Federal Farmer."
While minor errors like these may have little bearing on the
substantive arguments their authors go on to make, they do suggest
that historical operations in the Second Amendment theater of
combat are often mounted by campaigners not intimately familiar
with the terrain. These are raiders who know what they are looking
for, and having found it, they care little about collateral damage to
the surrounding countryside that historians better know as context. 2
7. See Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 228 (1983).
8. Id. at 229.
9. See id. at 222.
10. Compare Barnett & Kates, supra note 4, at 1211 nn.337-38, 1212 & n.344, with Stephen
P. Halbrook, To Keep and Bear Their Private Arms: The Adoption of the Second Amendment,
1787-1791, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 13,36 & n.90 (1982).
11. See HALBROOK, supra note 5, at 70-72; David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and
the Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL. 1, 26 n.101, 49-51 (1987); Kates, supra note
7, at 221-22; Levinson, supra note 3, at 647 n.49. On the identification of the Federal Farmer
with Melancton Smith of New York, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 228-29 (1996); Robert H. Webking,
Melancton Smith and the Letters from the Federal Farmer, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 510 (1987);
Gordon S. Wood, The Authorship of the Letters from the Federal Farmer, 31 WM. & MARY Q.
299 (1974).
12. To offer one trivial example: Individual right writers occasionally cite a letter by Fisher
Ames, the Massachusetts Federalist congressman, as evidence that "Madison's colleagues
clearly understood the proposal [his amendments of June 8, 1789] to be protective of individual
rights." HALBROOK, supra note 5, at 76 (citation omitted). Halbrook quotes Ames in this way:
2000]
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Like so many ventures in constitutional interpretation, Second
Amendment studies are vulnerable to the dishonoring charge of "law
office history" - that is, history made batman to the service of a
favored cause-although in this case the existence of a state of
ideological warfare may provide a better explanation of the
expedients to which the protagonists resort. 13
What better distinguishes the Second Amendment controversy
from other disputes, however, is the degree to which the individual
right interpretation of its meaning rests upon an explicit, robust
commitment to the theory of originalism. Two statements culled
from the preface to a leading work on the subject make the point
clearly. "Yet if the Bill of Rights has any meaning at all, it must be
based on the linguistic usage of those who wrote it," Stephen
Halbrook notes. 14 And again, in predicting some ultimate definitive
review of existing precedent by the Supreme Court: "The highest
court is bound not by judicial precedent but by the intent of the
framers of the Constitution"-who embrace not only the authors of
the Second Amendment but the Fourteenth as well. 5 To be sure, full
deployment of the individual right interpretation relies on another
doctrine that some originalists are loath to endorse, for converting the
Second Amendment into an effective shield against firearms
regulations that would emanate primarily from state and local
governments requires invoking the incorporation doctrine of the
"'Mr. Madison has introduced his long expected amendments .... It contains a bill of rights...
the right of the people to bear arms."' Id. The letter, in fact, says nothing about whether or not
the arms-bearing provision is to be understood as an individual right or a collective one. But
what Halbrook omits is more revealing. The second ellipsis in the quotation is preceded by this
comment:
This is the substance. There is too much of it. Oh! I had forgot, the right of the people
to bear arms. Risum teneatis amici? [Hold your laughter, friends.] Upon the whole, it
may do some good towards quieting men, who attend to sounds only, and may get the
mover [Madison] some popularity, which he wishes.
Letter from Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight (June 11, 1789), in 1 WORKS OF FISHER AMES-
AS PUBLISHED BY SETH AMES 641, 642 (W.B. Allen ed., 1983). Allen errs in placing a question
mark after "amici." The manuscript of this letter can be found in the Fisher Ames Papers at the
Dedham Historical Society, Massachusetts; with the assistance of Charlene Bangs Bickford, Ken
Bowling, and Chuck diGiacomantonio, I recently consulted a copy of this letter at the offices of
the Documentary History of the First Federal Congress project at George Washington
University. The real significance of this letter is that it confirms the deprecatory attitude that
many, perhaps most, congressmen took toward Madison's project of securing amendments. I
am grateful to my colleagues Brad Gregory and Philippe Buc for refining my crude sight
translation from the Latin-but I hasten to add that was their only involvement in this Article.
13. Many of these claims are deftly skewered in GARRY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT 112-22,252-60 (1999).
14. HALBROOK, supra note 5, at x.
15. Id. at xi-xii.
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Fourteenth Amendment.1 6  It would nevertheless be difficult to
identify any other constitutional controversy in which originalist
modes of analysis figure quite so prominently.
With apologies (not that any are called for) to Lenin, the Second
Amendment thus represents the highest stage of originalism, because
the advocates for its most expansive interpretation place their
greatest reliance on arguments about its meaning to the framers and
adopters of the Constitution and its earliest amendments. They do
this, too, in order to counter the seemingly commonsense notion that
would hold that this is the one clause of the Constitution for which
conclusions drawn from consequentialist arguments should weigh
most strongly. For at bottom, the case for the regulation of the sale,
use, and possession of firearms rests on the simple conviction that the
high number of casualties incurred annually by the deliberate and
accidental use of firearms provides a sufficient, not to say compelling,
justification for state action. It is doubtless important to establish as
well that this regulation is made legitimate by a long history of prior
legislation, judicial doctrines permitting such legislation, and a
reading of the Constitution that says that the Second Amendment
really was about supporting a militia that remained subject to the
legislative regulation of Congress and the states, while the states were
never divested of the fundamental responsibility for regulating
"internal police" in the interest of public health and welfare.17 But it
is reasonable to conclude that the most compelling arguments for
regulation stem from the perception that this is one realm of human
behavior where the concerns of the present have every right to
supersede the obsolescent understandings of generations long past.
Yet originalism remains a legitimate mode of constitutional
analysis, and even those who doubt its capacity and authority need to
respect its claims. By the same token, however, avowed originalists
can be held accountable for the suppositions on which they profess to
act, the quality of the originalist analyses they offer, and the criticisms
16. In this Article, I do not address the distinct claims about the relation between the
Fourteenth Amendment and the right to bear arms that might be made under the aegis either of
the original meaning of the former, especially as it related to the plight of the African American
freemen of the Reconstruction South, or the various theories of incorporation that lie at the
heart of so much modern constitutional jurisprudence.
17. This is not to deny that there are serious consequentialist arguments to be made on the
other side, typically emphasizing the deterrent value of firearms. But to reason whether the
availability of firearms does more to promote violent crime and accidental mayhem, on the one
hand, or to deter crime in the expectation that evildoers will always find ways to obtain
weapons, on the other, is to reason on decidedly nonoriginalist grounds.
2000]
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to which this theory of interpretation is vulnerable. It is far from a
self-evident truth that originalism is the sole authoritative mode of
constitutional interpretation, 18 nor do many who dabble in originalist
analyses always reflect on the logic of what they are doing. It is one
thing to ransack the sources for a set of useful quotations, another to
weigh their interpretative authority. Originalism is first and foremost
a theory of law and constitutional interpretation, but its viability
depends upon its approach to history and its use of historical
evidence.
As a venture in originalism, the individual right interpretation
depends upon two essential propositions, one concerned with the
definition of militia, the other with its function. Where a plain-text
reading of the Second Amendment in the light of the militia clause of
Article I, Section 8 might suggest that the institutional character of
the militia is subject to legislative definition by Congress, the
individual right interpretation insists that the militia must be
identified with the whole body of the people. In this view, the
concept of the militia had a fixed and consensually accepted meaning
in ordinary usage, so that it was essentially coterminous with the free
adult male population physically capable of bearing arms; and if the
language of the Constitution is not to be rendered completely plastic,
modern interpretation has to preserve that meaning. Such a militia
cannot be equated with our modern conception of the National
Guard, which is only a latter-day incarnation of the so-called "select
militia" that eighteenth-century republicans regarded as a surrogate
of the dreaded standing army-an institution too closely tied to
government to be counted upon as a defender of the people's
liberties. This definition in turn illuminates the key functional
argument on which the individual right interpretation also depends.
This argument insists that the ultimate purpose of a general militia is
to serve as a deterrent against the danger of tyranny, and that only a
well-armed people, possessing privately held weapons, can serve as a
countervailing latent force, discouraging would-be oppressors from
executing their nefarious schemes. This interpretation cannot afford
to limit the functions of the militia to those described in Article I,
18. For further reflections on the merits and claims of originalism as a theory of
constitutional interpretation, with particular reference to the Second Amendment debate, see
the essays by Daniel Farber and Michael Dorf in this Symposium. Daniel A. Farber, Disarmed
by Time: The Second Amendment and the Failure of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 167
(2000); Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 291 (2000).
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Section 8, which clearly treat the militia as a public institution whose
duties extend to the suppression of armed resistance against
government; it must instead insist upon its pre-, extra-, and even
anticonstitutional functions of resistance against tyranny to the point
of revolution.
These complementary arguments are originalist for two reasons.
First, the definition of the militia, on the crucial issue of membership,
cannot be left to legislative determination, as the Militia Clause and
the Necessary and Proper Clause might otherwise suggest.19 It instead
depends on the common usage of the time, and this steers us past the
four corners of the constitutional text into the political discourse of
the eighteenth century. Second, the rationale for maintaining a broad
definition of militia further depends upon the political understandings
of that era, in particular the belief and expectation that an armed
citizenry is a necessary deterrent against tyranny. A plain-text
reading of the Constitution, which treats the militia as an institution
for suppressing armed insurrection, and which nowhere endorses a
right to revolution against republican government, would not by itself
be conducive to that interpretation.
In assessing the merits of these originalist claims, it will also be
useful to keep in mind three difficulties that color any attempt to
provide an historically grounded account of the original meaning of
the Second Amendment. First, notwithstanding all the evidence that
individual right proponents profess to have adduced in support of
their views, there are, in fact, only a handful of sources from the
period of constitutional formation that bear directly on the questions
that lie at the heart of our current controversies about the regulation
of privately owned firearms. If Americans had indeed been
concerned with the impact of the Constitution on this right, and
addressed the subject directly, the proponents of the individual right
theory would not have to recycle the same handful of references to
the dissenters in the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention and the
protests of several Massachusetts towns against their state's proposed
constitution, or to rip promising snippets of quotations from the texts
and speeches in which they are embedded. Because the private
19. The Militia Clause grants Congress the power "[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia
to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 15. The Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress "[t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers [mentioned in
Article I, Section 8], and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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ownership and use of weapons were not at issue in the late 1780s, we
are compelled to draw inferences from observations that turn out, in
most cases, to be concerned with the militia and its public functions,
not with the individual ownership and use of firearms.20
Second, because eighteenth-century firearms were not nearly as
threatening or lethal as those available today, we similarly cannot
expect the discussants of the late 1780s to have cast their comments
about keeping and bearing arms in the same terms that we would.
Theirs was a rhetoric of public liberty, not public health; of the danger
from standing armies, not that of casual strangers, embittered family
members, violent youth gangs, freeway snipers, and careless weapons
keepers. Guns were so difficult to fire in the eighteenth century that
the very idea of being accidentally killed by one was itself hard to
conceive. Indeed, anyone wanting either to murder his family or
protect his home in the eighteenth century would have been better
advised (and much more likely) to grab an axe or knife than to load,
prime, and discharge a firearm. And even had guns been more
effective as personal weapons, it is nearly inconceivable that
eighteenth-century notions of the police power of state and local
governments would have precluded their regulation in the name of
some vague threat of tyranny. The American colonies and states
were not a libertarian utopia; their traditions of governance permitted
legislatures and institutions of local government to act vigorously in
the pursuit of public health and safety.
Third, our reading of the Second Amendment is conditioned by
the results of an era (or several eras) of modern rights-oriented
jurisprudence which naturally assumes that bills of rights exist to
create legally enforceable immunities against the coercive power of
the state. Whether this efflorescence of rights talk and the litigation
that accompanies it have been healthy developments for the
American polity is a subject of ongoing debate;2' but the
consequences for our conception of constitutional rights is clear. In
the eighteenth century, however, bills of rights were often regarded as
statements of principle, meant to inform and shape the political
behavior of both officials and citizens; but whether they established
20. Anyone consulting the index to the respective volumes of The Documentary History of
the Ratification of the Constitution will discover that there are only scattered entries under the
heading "Arms, Right to Bear," in contrast to the far more numerous entries under headings
like "Army, Standing" and "Militia."
21. On this point, see especially MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
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legally enforceable claims was far from certain.2 2 Many clauses in the
first eight amendments to the Constitution certainly aspired to have
and eventually acquired that character, but the Second Amendment is
arguably the one provision which partook most of the principle-
enunciating attributes of the early state declarations of rights. Our
quest to discover a perfect syntax and vocabulary for its twenty-seven
words thus risks ascribing to a general statement of principle a
measure of legal exactitude it was never conceived to carry.
Finally, it might be worth stating, in as precise a form as possible,
the rival propositions upon which an evaluation of the originalist
approach to the Second Amendment should, in my view, depend. In
its most succinct form, the individual right interpretation equates the
people whose right to arms the Amendment protects with the entire
body of the citizenry, who are members of a general militia that
exists, to some significant extent, independently of legislative
provision. The purpose and function of that right rest, in part, on the
individual's natural right of self-protection, but they depend more
fundamentally on the value of preserving an armed citizenry as a
deterrent to oppression, in the (latent) exercise of a natural right of
resistance that would be abrogated if citizens lacked access to the
arms required to challenge tyranny emanating from either national or
state governments.23 These concerns were so deeply embedded in
eighteenth-century American political culture as to trump the two
countervailing propositions upon which the collective right
interpretation in turn rests. First, the extant records of deliberation
(as well as the plain text) of the Constitution strongly suggest that the
only issue its adopters were consciously considering was the militia,
22. For further discussion, see AMAR, supra note 2, at 131-32; DONALD S. LUTZ, POPULAR
CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG POLITICAL THEORY IN THE EARLY STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 59-71 (1980); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 271-73 (1969). See also JACK N. RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS: A
BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS (1998), in which I attempt to trace the ambiguities in
American thinking about the exact juridical authority and reach of declarations of rights.
23. It would be interesting to test this proposition against the historical record of how
revolutions actually succeed, in the process differentiating revolutions in which the authority of
an entrenched regime actually collapsed from civil wars in which two well-armed camps
contended for victory against each other. Arguably the Russian Revolution of the spring of
1917 (but not the ensuing conflict following the October coup of the Bolsheviks) would
illustrate the former case, the Chinese revolution of the 1940s the latter. Iran in 1979, though
not an example Americans would feel partial to endorsing, makes an interesting case. The
success of that revolution clearly did not depend on the mass of the population having
countervailing armed forces to apply against and overturn the authority of the shah; rather, it
succeeded because the mass of the population had come to reject his right to rule, and the
bloody efforts of his armed forces to preserve the regime led only to the collapse of their own
willingness and capacity to support the regime.
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which would henceforth exist as an institution defined by law. No
coherent intention or understanding of the existence and scope of a
private, individual right to keep and bear arms could accordingly be
derived, because that question did not present itself for public debate
in the form in which we now know it. Second, and arguably more
important, the attachment that some currents of eighteenth-century
political thinking did place on the deterrent value of an armed
citizenry should be counterposed to the orthodox understanding of
the extent of the police powers of the state (or in the American case,
the states), which authorized government to legislate broadly in
pursuit of the public health and welfare. 24 This belief was no less a
matter of constitutional orthodoxy in the late eighteenth century than
the general principle that standing armies posed a danger to liberty
that might best be avoided by maintaining a well-regulated citizen
militia, and it therefore casts the originalist dimensions of the Second
Amendment debate in the most critical light. To ask whether
contemporaries would have allowed the individual right inter-
pretation of the Second Amendment to trump this orthodox
conception of the regulatory police power of the states identifies, I
believe, the true conundrum or desideratum. In effect, the individual
right interpretation elevates the speculative danger of tyranny, rooted
in potent historic memories of the turmoil of seventeenth-century
England, above the observed costs and casualties that the modern cry
for firearms regulation seeks to address. Conversely, the collective
right interpretation inverts these concerns. It presumes that the
manifest dangers of the present outweigh the memories of the past,
and indeed that the living generation has a right to seek security
against the wanton abuse of firearms, consistent with the principles
that have long enabled states and localities to legislate on behalf of
public health and welfare.
For the record, then, I believe that the current controversy over
the meaning of the Second Amendment, if treated primarily as a
problem of originalism, should be cast in these terms: Would the
24. In stating this point, I refer especially to WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S
WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996), a work which
is admittedly concerned with the post-Revolutionary era. Yet Novak's account is also fully
consistent with the description of eighteenth-century political economy provided in such classic
works as OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861 (1947).
There is no reason to think that the Revolutionary era-whatever other changes it introduced in
constitutional theory-engendered a shift in underlying understandings of the inherent police
power of the states.
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presumed preexisting equation of the militia with an armed mass of
the citizenry, justified by the need to preserve a natural right of
revolution, outweigh (1) the evidence that the principal concern of
the late 1780s lay with allocating legislative power over the militia
between national and state governments, and (2) the traditional
understanding of the police power that the Tenth Amendment
(truism that it may be) would have reserved to the states.
ORIGINALISM: SOME METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS
All exercises in constitutional interpretation begin with a text,
but originalism cannot be reduced to mere textualism. A merely
textualist approach can stipulate that the word people has the same
meaning in the Second Amendment as it has in the Fourth
Amendment or the Petition and Assembly Clause of the First
Amendment or the unenumerated rights and reserved powers of the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments.25 This assumption, though not
unreasonable, is itself an arbitrary one, for reasons that James
Madison well explained in The Federalist No. 37 when he observed
that "no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for
every complex idea, or so correct as not to include many equivocally
denoting different ideas. '26 But, in any case, if the meaning of a
disputed term could be determined simply by analyzing its usage
within the four corners of the constitutional text, originalism in any
substantive sense would be superfluous. Originalism begins where
textualism alone fails. It assumes that the meaning of a provision
cannot be ascertained by staring at it long enough or juxtaposing it
with other relevant clauses, but must instead be derived from usage or
elaborated in terms of some contemporary context of thought and
debate, thus requiring the intrepid interpreter to initiate an inquiry
into sources extrinsic to the text.
If we were dealing with the text of the original, unamended
Constitution, we could bring four main sets of sources to bear on our
interpretative quest. Two of these consist of the records of debate
from the constitutional deliberations of the late 1780s: the journal and
notes of debates from the Constitutional Convention of 1787, which
25. This is in fact a mantra encountered in most writings favoring the individual right
interpretation. See HALBROOK, supra note 5, at 83; JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND
BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 162 (1994); Levinson, supra note
3, at 645.
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (James Madison), in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 346 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 1984).
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offer the best evidence of the "original intentions" of the authorial
framers; and the records of the ratification campaign that ensued,
which illuminate the "original understanding(s)" of the public and the
delegates in the state conventions. The two other sets of sources,
necessarily defined more broadly, might be labeled contextual. One
consists of the variety of inherited intellectual traditions, discourses,
and languages that collectively constituted the underlying political
grammar and conceptual vocabulary of debate. The second, rather
more elusive category comprises what might be called the lessons of
recent experience: issues and concerns, perceptions and preferences
shaped in the crucible of revolution. 7
This classification of the different categories of evidence relevant
to originalist forays leads to two further observations. First, all
originalist inquiries are necessarily historical in nature, and therefore
should be conducted with some attention to the problems that
historians encounter in weighing the uses and limits of different forms
of evidence. Better to be conscious about the nature of the evidence,
and its particular properties, than to lump all of its morsels into one
hotch-potch of tasty quotations. Second, and rather more
problematic, the task of distinguishing different forms of evidence
exposes critical differences in the ways in which historians and legal
analysts might evaluate the probative value of the sources. Historians
attempting to divine the original meaning of the Constitution would
prefer the intentions of the framers to the understandings of the
ratifiers, because while the latter were merely giving or withholding
their assent to the completed document, the former were making the
actual decisions that gave it form and content. But the normative
principles on which the robust form of originalism rests place greater
weight on ratifier understanding and treat the framers' expressed
intentions as probative only insofar as they illuminate what the
ratifiers were also thinking.28
Several additional qualifications deserve consideration when we
turn our attention from the main text of the Constitution to the
original meaning of its amendments. First, the conditions under
which the First Congress assembled in the early spring of 1789
differed significantly from those governing the gathering of the
27. For further discussion, see RAKOVE, supra note 11, at 11-22, 27.
28. For further discussion of this distinction between framer-intent and ratifier-
understanding, see id. at 7-11; Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent?, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 117
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990).
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Constitutional Convention two years earlier. When the framers of
the Constitution straggled into Philadelphia in May 1787, public
discussion of their potential agenda of action remained diffuse and
unfocused-which in turn explains why James Madison's efforts to
shape that agenda loom so large in understanding why the
Convention took the course it did. Madison admittedly played
something of the same role in forcing the First Congress to pursue
"the nauseous project" of amendments, but the proposals he placed
before the House of Representatives in his revealing speech of June
8, 1789 had been culled from the extensive corpus of amendments
recommended by the state ratification conventions in response to the
wide-ranging public discussion of the Constitution that began with its
publication on September 19, 1787.29
Second (and conversely), the amendments that Congress finally
proposed to the states in August 1789 received nothing like the
sustained public discussion that greeted the original Constitution.
Scholars who have gone hunting for evidence of the reception of the
Bill of Rights typically come back disappointed. There are scattered
traces of popular responses to the substance of the amendments-
including a few items relating to the Second Amendment 3°-but in
comparison to the mass of materials from the prior discussions, the
pickings are slim.3
Third, it is important to note that the drafting of the amendments
was controlled by Federalists who remained skeptical, like Madison
himself, of the value or necessity of a national bill of rights. The
concessions extracted from Federalists in closely contested states to
join in recommending amendments to the consideration of Congress
amounted to something less than a firm agreement. By the time
29. Madison's preparations for 1787 and 1789 are described in RAKOVE, supra note 11, at
42-56, 330-36. His seemingly disparaging comment about the project of amendments was made
in a Letter to Richard Peters (Aug. 19, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 346-47
(Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979). For his speech introducing the amendments, see James
Madison, Speech Before the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra, at 196-209. Madison culled the proposals from a pamphlet published
in the fall of 1788, titled The Ratifications of the New Foederal Constitution, Together with the
Amendments, Proposed by the Several States (1788). See 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON,
supra, at 300 n.2.
30. Particularly a single sentence from an early essay by Tench Coxe, discussed further
infra note 46. Halbrook tells us that this essay was "widely reprinted," but his corroboratory
note lists only two such printings. It is also a non sequitur to conclude that the absence of any
evidence that any writer "disputed or contradicted Coxe's analysis" means that it would have
been generally accepted; silence can mean indifference as easily as approbation. HALBROOK,
supra note 5, at 77, 224 n.152.
31. See ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, FROM PARCHMENT TO POWER: How JAMES MADISON
USED THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO SAVE THE CONSTITUTION 167-73 (1997).
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Congress assembled in the early spring of 1789, Federalists had
emerged decisive victors in the first national elections, and the
difficulty Madison encountered in convincing his colleagues to take
up the issue suggests that few of them thought that prompt action on
amendments was required to fulfill the ostensible bargain struck the
year before. Madison, of course, felt otherwise. He had publicly
committed himself to support amendments in the course of his
difficult campaign against James Monroe for election to the House,
and-Madison being Madison-he was the most likely member to
undertake the initiative of actually drafting amendments. Equally
important, Madison understood that prompt consideration of suitable
amendments would be a fitting capstone to the entire ratification
process, insofar as it would conciliate those moderate Antifederalists
who sincerely if misguidedly believed that a constitution lacking a bill
of rights was defective. But his motives in proposing his amendments,
as his speech of June 8, 1789 makes clear, were far more political than
jurisprudential, and the lack of enthusiasm that Congress showed for
his "nauseous project" suggests that many of his colleagues remained
skeptical about the value of the exercise.3 2 Conversely, to those
Antifederalists who had managed to get elected to Congress, the
cause of amendments had lost much of its luster. While still
supportive of the general idea of rights-protecting amendments, they
now knew that all the other substantive changes they desired lay well
beyond the realm of political acceptance.
Understanding this aspect of the politics behind the Bill of Rights
is critical to an originalist inquiry because it indicates that the final
decisions about the scope and content of Madison's proposals were
left not to those who were most ardent for the cause of amendmrents
but to those who doubted that such amendments were even useful,
much less necessary. Or to put the point more directly: Federalists
did not cave in to their opponents' demands, or modify the
Constitution to meet their substantive criticisms; nor, conversely,
were Antifederalists in any position to impose their understandings
on the party that emerged dominant from the first national elections.
The claim that the best or most representative reading of the
language of the amendments would conform to the understanding
and concerns of the Constitution's original opponents is therefore
highly problematic. Comments from across the entire political
32. For general discussion, see RAKOVE, supra note 11, at 330-36; Paul Finkelman, James
Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301.
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spectrum remain relevant to capturing the range of meanings that
Americans ascribed to the protections incorporated in the first ten
amendments, but to claim that an ordinal Antifederalist under-
standing would be dispositive is simply wrong.33
Finally, the decision to frame the amendments as supplemental
articles, rather than follow Madison's proposal to insert them directly
into the original constitutional text, arguably had the effect of
preserving a modicum of the juridical ambiguity that had previously
made it difficult to ascertain the exact constitutional status of
declarations of rights. Did such documents establish legally
enforceable claims, or were they better construed as statements of
principle, meant to guide officials in the exercise of their duties and to
enable the people at large to monitor and judge the conduct of their
rulers, by laying down standards whose violation would expose a
deeper threat to liberty? A bill of rights, in this view, was more a
political than a legal text. It was precisely because declarations of
rights, of the kind that accompanied many of the early state
constitutions, could so be read that Madison originally proposed to
"interweave" his amendments with the text of the Constitution.
Adopted in that way, they would act as explicit restrictions affecting
particular institutions of government; their legal authority would
become more precise and explicit, thereby enhancing the security
afforded to rights. Conversely, framing the amendments as
supplemental articles, Madison warned, would make it "difficult to
ascertain to what parts of the instrument [the Constitution] the
amendments particularly refer. 3 4 But that, of course, was exactly
what Congress ultimately preferred to do. In taking that course,
however, the majority arguably still shared the dominant conception
of 1776 which viewed a bill of rights as a statement of principles
affirming the existence of particular rights but not clearly delegating
responsibility for their enforcement or protection to any institution.
One final consideration arguably differentiates originalist
interpretations of the Bill of Rights from those relating to the main
text of the Constitution. The latter is essentially a closely integrated
bundle of provisions organizing institutions of government, defining
their respective powers, and establishing rules for the appointment
33. One can only wonder whom David Williams means to identify when he speaks of "the
Anti-Federalist framers of the Second Amendment." David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism
and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 584 (1991).
34. James Madison, Proposal for Constitutional Amendments (Aug. 13, 1789), in 12 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 29, at 333.
2000]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
and tenure of their members. Though concepts derived from English
constitutional history exerted important lingering influences over
these matters, it was the experience of American republican
constitutionalism since 1776, coupled with the inherently federal
structure of the Union and the divided sovereignty to which it led,
that defined the parameters of deliberation and decision making at
Philadelphia. 35 On matters of practical constitutional design, Hobbes
and Locke, potent political thinkers that they were, had little to teach
Americans, and American constitutionalism was formed, in any case,
in reaction against many facets of the eighteenth-century British
constitution. But in the realm of rights, where the legacy of the
common-law mind operated so powerfully, a stronger case can be
made for some continuities in understanding between prior Anglo-
American thinking and the formulations of the 1770s and 1780s.
Particular rights had an independent history of their own, and
Leonard Levy and other scholars have indeed demonstrated the
possibility of tracing changing notions of the substance and content of
particular rights in a way that pays close attention to existing (and
evolving) legal doctrine. The right to bear arms is clearly susceptible
to the same kind of examination. But we can never forget that it is a
history-that is, a process of change over time-that we are tracing,
and that the ways in which Americans conceived of and formulated
rights were a product not just of what they had inherited but of what
they had experienced. American "rights talk," as Richard Primus has
recently argued, is a contingent "social practice" that always reflects
immediate political commitments and struggles.36
All of these strictures about the practice of originalism may seem
excessively fussy-to demand more precision and nuance than the
subject really requires. Perhaps the original meaning of the
Constitution, like pornography, is something we can just recognize as
a matter of common sense. Of course James Madison and his
colleagues never imagined that the Constitution could mean X [insert
your least favorite interpretation of a particular provision or some
other controversial doctrine]. But if originalism is to be taken
seriously-and not simply invoked as a rhetorical club in the cause of
legal or political argument-the analytical problems it poses require
35. Here I obviously rely on WOOD, supra note 22.
36. RICHARD PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 28 (1999). For an
appraisal of this book, see Jack N. Rakove & Elizabeth Beaumont, Rights Talk in the Past
Tense, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1865 (2000) (book review).
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reflection; and the dispute over the meaning of the Second
Amendment cannot be immune to that scrutiny.
TEXT
All constitutional inquiry begins with the authoritative text,
which may be visually imagined as a scriptural statement surrounded
by columns of commentaries that consist of evidence to be derived
from the deliberations that produced the actual language, popular
discussions during the ratification campaign, intellectual traditions,
and what I have called lessons of experience. As everyone knows, the
essential textualist controversy over the Second Amendment revolves
around the relation, if any, between the formula ("A well regulated
Militia being necessary to the security of a free State") and the
operative statement that "the right of the people to keep and bear
arms, shall not be infringed." Staring at the sentence or reading it
aloud will not decide whether the preamble is superfluous or deeply
informative of the end the right is meant to attain. Instead, a textual
analysis can take at least these forms: correlating the meaning of
"people" with other uses in the Constitution; doing the same for
"Militia"; and asking what light the evolution of the specific textual
formula finally adopted might shed on the intentions of its framers. 3
Defenders of the individual right interpretation emphasize (as already
noted) the harmony between the "people" of the Second
Amendment and the putatively identical entity of the First, Fourth,
Ninth, and Tenth Amendments.38 As we shall see, however, they are
37. This third mode of analysis arguably blurs the difference between mere textualism and
originalism, for it requires a turn to legislative history (or its equivalent) in order to ascertain
how the intentions of the document's framers were reflected in their final editorial decisions
about the text. Given the absence of recorded congressional debate about the key changes in
the text of the Second Amendment, however, it seems useful to treat these editorial revisions as
a mode of primarily textual analysis, the more so when we have to infer intention from changes
between drafts.
38. One does not have to read very far in the Constitution to learn that the House of
Representatives will be "chosen... by the People of the several States," but that this people
actually consists of a rather smaller set of "Electors," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, and that the
definition of this subset of the whole people will be left to the state legislatures. Or again,
Sanford Levinson suggests (in support of the usual linkage among all the uses of "people" in the
Bill of Rights) that "it would approach the frivolous to read the assembly and petition clause as
referring only to the right of state legislatures to meet and pass a remonstrance directed to
Congress or the President against some governmental act." So it would. Levinson, supra note
3, at 645. But it is not frivolous to suggest that the single word people has different valences in
different provisions of the Bill of Rights. The concept of a collective people embracing the
entire corpus of private individuals seems strongest or most explicit in the Fourth Amendment's
opening reference to "The right of the people to be secure in their persons." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. But the Petition and Assembly Clause of the First Amendment can be read as a
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rather more reluctant to link the "militia" of the preamble to the
institution provided for in Article I of the Constitution; here they
prefer a preexisting definition not dependent on the specific provision
made for its future organization.
What can we infer about the meaning of the Second
Amendment, as finally approved, by tracing its textual evolution?
The changes made as the Amendment worked its way through
Congress support two main inferences. One concerns the omission of
a significant qualifier evoking a particular definition of the militia; the
other reveals a potentially important alteration in syntax.
As first introduced by Madison on June 8, the clause read: "The
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a
well armed, and well regulated militia being the best security of a free
country: but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be
compelled to render military service in person."39  Here Madison
statement of a right held primarily not by individual rights-bearers, but rather by a community
or a minority that has coalesced for purposes of political action. Interestingly, the legislative
history of the petition half of the clause seems to imply a movement from an individual right to
a collective one. The corresponding articles recommended by four of the state ratification
conventions distinguish a collective right of the people to assemble for political purposes, on the
one hand, and a personal right to petition for the redress of grievances. In the words of the New
York resolution, "That the People have a right peaceably to assemble together to consult for
their common good, or to instruct their Representatives; and that every person [freeman in the
other versions] has a right to Petition or apply to the Legislature for redress of Grievances."
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 140 (Neil
H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS]. The language of the Assembly
and Petition Clause, however, collapses this distinction, and by its use of the conjunction "and"
to link the two members, rather than the "or" which separates the other rights of the First
Amendment, it seemingly converts an individual right of petition into a collective right of
(peaceful) protest. Recorded debate on the clause in the House of Representatives was
primarily concerned with the omission of any reference to the people's right to issue instructions
to their representatives. See id. at 143-64.
One can play all kinds of language games, especially if we engage in the further maneuver
of noting that the framers could always have stated their meaning more explicitly. If they were
really intent on protecting an individual right of gun ownership, one could argue, they could
have written the Second Amendment to read, "no person shall be deprived of his right to keep
and bear arms for his own and the common defense." Choosing the plural "people" is thus
inherently more conducive to a collective than an individual right interpretation. Bringing the
Tenth Amendment into the equation also raises some interesting questions. Its language
reserves not rights but "powers" to either the states or the people; but the power of raising a
militia was a matter of legislative authority, not popular initiative. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
This is a useful point to clarify the relation between Akhil Amar's treatment of the right to
bear arms and those of the individual right theorists. Although Amar agrees that the equation
of militia and people precludes identifying the former with an institution like the National
Guard, his "communitarian" reading of the Second Amendment does not endorse the broad
individual right interpretation which sees the militia as an entity existing prior to or
independently of public regulation. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 51.
39. COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 38, at 169. Malcolm erroneously claims that
"Madison's original version of the amendment, as well as those suggested by the states,
described the militia as either 'composed of' or 'including' the body of the people." MALCOLM,
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departed from the corresponding recommendation of the Virginia
Ratification Convention (item seventeen in its proposed list of
enumerated rights), and the formulation to which he was likely to be
most sensitive. The Virginia resolution began: "That the people have
a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated Militia composed
of the body of the people trained to arms is the proper, natural and
safe defence of a free State .... "40 Both Madison's and the Virginia
convention's versions arguably recognized two rights, not one: a right
to bear arms, not explicitly tied to membership in the militia; and a
right to enjoy the superior form of defense afforded by a well-
regulated militia, which would obviate the need for the standing army
that the original Virginia resolution had then denounced, though with
a warning rather than a flat prohibition.41 Madison had omitted the
clause defining the militia as "the body of the people," but he
preserved the duality of rights. Moreover, his respective use of the
semicolon and colon in this article suggested that the concept of a
well-regulated militia served to justify the exclusion of the religiously
scrupulous from military service, not the importance of the people
keeping and bearing arms.42
The committee of the House to which Madison's amendments
were referred made two changes in his draft.43 First, it transposed the
supra note 25, at 162-63. Madison's version did neither. Malcolm also notes that "not one of
the ninety-seven distinct amendments proposed by state ratifying conventions asked for a return
of any control that had been allocated to the federal government over the militia." Id. at 163.
One cannot be sure how narrowly Malcolm wants to define "return," but here is the text of the
eleventh amendment proposed by the Virginia convention:
That each State respectively shall have the power to provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining its own militia, whensoever Congress shall omit or neglect to provide
for the same. That the militia shall not be subject to martial law, except when in actual
service in time of war, invasion or rebellion, and when not in the actual service of the
United States, shall be subject only to such fines, penalties and punishments, as shall
be directed or inflicted by the laws of its own State.
10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1554 (J.
Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 1993).
40. COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 38, at 182.
41. "That standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, and therefore ought to
be avoided, as far as the circumstances and protection of the Community will admit." Id. at 182-
83. This wording, of course, illustrates the idea that a bill of rights could consist not of legally
enforceable claims but rather of general principles for the guidance of officials and citizens.
42. The clause granting exemptions from militia service to religious objectors was derived
from the nineteenth amendment recommended by the Virginia convention.
Whether Madison was thinking of two rights (arms-bearing distinguished from the security
provided by the militia) is, however, far from certain. The use of "being" can still be read to
imply that the militia clause modifies the arms-bearing one (semicolon be damned, so to speak);
while if the militia clause serves as a preamble to the "religiously scrupulous" one, the use of the
conjunction "but" would appear superfluous.
43. Malcolm errs in noting that Madison's proposed amendments were referred to a
committee of three members (Madison, Roger Sherman, and John Vining). See MALCOLM,
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syntax so that the Amendment took its eventual form, placing the
reference to the militia first and replacing the semicolon separating
the two members of the clause with a comma. Second, it offered a
more specific definition of the militia. The clause now read: "A well
regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, being the best
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed, but no person religiously scrupulous shall be
compelled bear arms."44 This new definition of the militia was in turn
eliminated in the Senate, where the Amendment received its final
form. On September 4, the Senate first entertained, but rejected, a
motion to add the elements of the Virginia recommendation that
Madison had omitted. Five days later, it rejected a motion to insert
"for the common defence" after "arms," and then proceeded to
replace "the best Security" with "necessary to the Security." In its
now final form, the Amendment went to the House, which accepted it
without apparent objection.4
None of this legislative history of the drafting of the Second
Amendment conclusively resolves the vexed question that lies at the
heart of the entire controversy: whether "the people" is best
interpreted as the entire citizenry, as the individual right
interpretation insists; or simply refers instead to whatever form a
militia composed of soldiers who retain a significant measure of their
civilian identity might take, as the collective right interpretation and
prevailing law hold. Defenders of the individual right interpretation
like to point to the outline for Madison's speech of June 8, 1789,
which contains a note seemingly stating that his proposed
amendments "relate 1st. to private rights," as evidence that Madison
so regarded the right to bear arms.46 But that terse inscription stands
alone, and is not explicitly linked to the right to bear arms; Madison's
sole reference to arms alludes to the parliamentary Bill of Rights of
1689, and there is no corresponding passage in the recorded version
of his speech that develops this point.47 Nor does Madison's proposed
supra note 25, at 160. After their introduction on June 8, the amendments were first referred to
a committee of the whole House, and then, after the House of Representatives failed to find
time to address the issue, to a committee of one member from each state, appointed on July 21,
which in turn reported on July 28. See 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: MARCH 4, 1789-MARCH 3, 1791, at 84, 117,
124 (Linda Grant DePauw ed., 1977).
44. COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 38, at 170.
45. See id. at 174-76.
46. Notes for Speech in Congress [ca. June 8, 1789], in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 29, at 193.
47. Id. at 193-94. The use of "private rights" is further separated from the reference to
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placement of this right in Article I, Section 9 conclusively
demonstrate its fundamentally private nature, as individual right
theorists like to contend, because the original version of the Petition
and Assembly Clause would have immediately preceded it, and that
clause, as previously noted, is also susceptible to a collective right
interpretation. The controlling theme of Article I, Section 9 is neither
the definition of individual rights nor restrictions on the powers of the
states (the subject of Section 10), but limitations on the powers of
Congress.48
The most striking defect in the textualist component of the
individual right interpretation lies elsewhere, however-in the
disparity in the ways in which the key words "people" and "militia"
1689 by a new heading: "Bills of Rights-useful-not essential." Perhaps not surprisingly,
Halbrook omits this intervening statement when he quotes Madison's outline, without inserting
the required ellipses. See HALBROOK, supra note 5, at 76.
48. Nor, it might be added, does the individual right interpretation derive as much support
as it claims from a recurring reference to the explanatory essay published by Tench Coxe ten
days after Madison's speech introducing the amendments. In this essay, Coxe glossed
Madison's proposal with the observation that "the people are confirmed by the next article in
their right to keep and bear their private arms." A Pennsylvanian (Tench Coxe), Remarks on
the First Part of the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, PHILADELPHIA FED. GAZETrE,
June 18, 1789, at 2 (emphasis added). At that point, however, Coxe could only have been
commenting on the language and structure of Madison's original proposal, which, as noted
earlier, did imply that the right of the people to bear arms was distinct from their right to enjoy
a well-regulated militia; the changes that produced the final text of the Amendment, linking the
preamble to the arms-bearing clause more directly, were more than two months in the future.
To say, as Glenn Reynolds and others writers repeatedly do, that "James Madison approved of
Coxe's construction of the Second Amendment," is therefore incorrect on at least two grounds.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461,468
n.29 (1995). First, the letter from which this seal of approval is extracted was written on June
24, again well in advance of the changes subsequently made by Congress. Second, Madison did
not discuss the substance or merits of Coxe's interpretation of particular rights. Here is his
entire comment:
It is much to be wished that the discon[ten]ted part of our fellow Citizens could be
reconciled to the Government they have opposed, and by means as little as possible
unacceptable to those who approve the Constitution in its present form. The
amendments proposed in the H. of Reps. had this twofold object in view; besides the
third one of avoiding all controvertible points which might endanger the assent of 2/3
of each branch of Congs. and 3/4 of the State Legislatures. How far the experiment
may succeed in any of these respects is wholly uncertain. It will however be greatly
favored by explanatory strictures of a healing tendency, and is therefore already
indebted to the co-operation of your pen.
Letter from James Madison to Tench Coxe (June 24, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 29, at 257.
In fact, during the ratification campaign proper, Coxe had written other essays, which went
to some length to emphasize the reserved legislative powers of the states, including the police
powers associated with public health and welfare, and one would have to indulge some rather
bold leaps of the historical imagination to infer that he had suddenly decided that recognition of
an individual right to bear arms trumped the authority of the states in this respect. See
especially his second essay written under the pen name "A Freeman," PA. GAZETrE, Jan. 30,
1788, in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 26, at 508.
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are defined. However one gauges the relative authority of the two
sections of the Second Amendment, a reading which assumes the
primacy of text would insist that every word be given due weight;
indeed, textualism, as practiced by someone like Akhil Amar, seems
to presuppose that each word has been exquisitely chosen to fit a
completely consistent constitutional vision. But in this case, textualist
practice proves curiously inconsistent. "People" is routinely defined
intratextually, by reference to its use in other amendments; but
"militia" leaps beyond the proverbial four corners of the document,
and is parsed in terms of a historically contingent definition of what
the militia has been and must presumably evermore be.
Amar himself provides a case in point. Citing Kates, Amar first
tells us that "when used without any qualifying adjective"-such as
the notorious "select"-"'the militia' referred to all citizens capable
of bearing arms," making the "militia" of the dependent clause of the
Amendment identical with the "people" of the main clause. 49  The
House would have made that equation explicit when it added the
qualifying phrase "composed of the body of the people" to its draft;
when the Senate "stylistically shortened" the clause by deleting that
phrase, it presumably only restored that assumed definition. 0 But
49. AMAR, supra note 2, at 51.
50. Id. at 51-52. The argument for "stylistic shortening" seems to have two parts: one
holding that the formula defining the militia as the people was unnecessary because redundant
of common usage; the other suggesting that the insertion of this phrase would have rendered the
Amendment a more awkward text, presumably by repetition of the phrase, "the people." Amar
has thus suggested that "[a] modern translation of the amendment might thus be: 'An armed
and militarily trained citizenry being conducive to freedom, the right of the electorate to
organize itself militarily shall not be infringed."' Akhil Reed Amar, Second Thoughts: What the
Right to Bear Arms Really Means, NEW REPUBLIC, July 12, 1999, at 24, 24-25. How the
electorate-presumably excluding the citizen soldiers of the National Guard-would in fact
organize itself militarily is not explained, but the possibilities are endless. (Could drivers of
sport utility vehicles, for example, spontaneously mobilize as an armored corps? Would Greens
form up as mountain troops?) While we are playing the counter-textual game, we might also
suggest that a Senate anxious to preserve the broad reading of the militia-as-people without
risking redundancy could have written the Amendment this way: "A well regulated militia,
composed of the body of the people, being necessary to the security of a free state, their right to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."
Malcolm similarly argues away the apparent significance of the changes in the text by
explaining: "Doubtless congressmen felt no qualms about streamlining the language and
omitting explanatory phrases because their constituents shared an understanding of the
institutions and opinions behind it. But, in the long term, these understandings have vanished
and brevity and elegance have been achieved at the cost of clarity." MALCOLM, supra note 25,
at 161; see also David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution:
Conjuring with the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 907 (1996) (agreeing that "that omission
seems stylistic, not substantive"). Somehow, without really seeking to alter the meaning of the
language, the framers of the Amendment kept tinkering with it, but the changes they imposed
were immaterial because of a preexisting understanding of "the people"; yet somehow, too, a
more "elegant" text actually disguised the meaning they intended to impart. But, of course,
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how do we know that this senatorial editing was only stylistic and not
substantive? Any effort to define "militia" intratextually must begin
with Article I, Section 8, Clause 16, which treats the militia as an
entity that Congress has the legislative responsibility for "organizing,
arming, and disciplining." The effect of the Senate's editing was to
leave the extent of the militia open to congressional discretion. It
might well remain plausible to assume that Americans hoped and
even expected that the militia would continue to resemble the body of
the people, but any plain-text reading would suggest that Congress
retained all the authority it needed to determine whether a select
militia would or would not prove more desirable than a massed array
of the whole male population. Rather than accept this strictly or
merely textual reading of the relevant language, Amar has to reach
beyond the text to suggest that "Anti-Federalist and republican
ideology" offers the best clues to the fixed meaning of militia. The
meaning of militia in the original Constitution now depends on its
meaning in the Second Amendment, even though the final version of
that Amendment eliminated the qualifying phrase that exponents of
"Anti-Federalist and republican ideology" would have preferred.
Unfortunately, there were only two Antifederalists in the Senate,
both from Virginia, and it is simply counter-intuitive to suppose that
they would have favored eliminating the qualifying phrase that their
own state's ratification convention had originally proposed.5
Federalists who were willing to assuage Antifederalist concerns only if doing so ran no risk of
altering the substance of the powers granted to the national government would have had valid
reasons to eliminate a phrase that could be interpreted as a restraint on the discretionary
authority of Congress.
51. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 56. Amar further tells us that "jealousy and vigilance are at
the heart of the amendment's gloss on clause 16 [the Militia Clause of Article I, Section 8]," and
that he has "emphasized republican ideology about militias and armies because that ideology
was expressly written into the amendment's preamble." Id. Had that ideology really been
"expressly written" into the preamble, we would expect to find the usual admonition against
standing armies present; its absence, like the omission of the word "expressly" from the Tenth
Amendment, reminds us that the spokesmen for the traditional "Anti-Federalist and republican
ideology" were not in a position to dictate the content of the Bill of Rights. Amar's
interpretation thus seems to rely upon a politically doubtful reconstruction of what was actually
transpiring. It is worth noting that the Senate did entertain a motion, almost certainly
introduced by the two Virginia Antifederalists, Richard Henry Lee and William Grayson, to
add to the Amendment further language, derived from the amendments proposed by the
Virginia Ratification Convention, denouncing standing armies as "dangerous to Liberty," urging
their avoidance "as far as the circumstances and protection of the community will admit,"
affirming civilian superiority over the military, and imposing a super-majoritarian requirement
to raise a standing army in peacetime. COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 38, at 173-74; see
also the relevant Virginia resolutions, 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 39, at 1553-54. This motion, which was rejected, would have
been a far more genuine expression of "Anti-Federalist and republican ideology" than the final
language of the Amendment.
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A textualist reading of the evolution of the Amendment could
plausibly support at least these inferences. First, if Congress was
intent on preserving the traditional image of the militia as the
collective body of the people, as the individual right interpretation
suggests, its elimination of the appropriate language to that effect is
surprising. Congress had open to it the option of engrafting a more
expansive definition of the militia onto the Constitution; it rejected
that option. Second, if the semicolon in Madison's original resolution
could be read as stating two distinct rights, not one, its replacement
by a comma would seem to connect the two members of the
Amendment more closely; that is, it would link the preamble and the
right more intimately than had been the case before, and thereby tie
the right of arms bearing to the institution of the militia. Third, if it is
conceded that the reference to militia in the preamble to the
Amendment has some relevance to its meaning-which of course a
textualist must, because textualism presumes that every word is there
with a purpose-then a textual approach requires us to ask how other
provisions of the Constitution use the same term; and any reader of
Article I, Section 8 would find it hard to deny that the text there
considers the militia not as an unorganized mass of the citizenry but
as an institution subject to close legislative regulation. Fourth,
acceptance of language restricting the people's right to bear arms to
matters relating to the "common defence" would have had the effect
of curtailing the capacity of the militia to be deployed for the other
purposes assigned in Article I, Section 8: "to execute the Laws of the
Union" and to "suppress Insurrections." But Congress rejected that
limitation, and the militia of the Second Amendment thus remained
an entity to be mobilized to preserve, not subvert the Constitution.
One might presumably argue that the militia could spontaneously
mobilize to protect the Constitution against a government staging an
anticonstitutional coup de main, coup de marche, or coup d'etat, but
nothing in the text of the Constitution supports that conception of its
role.
FRAMERS' INTENTIONS
One striking aspect of the standard statements of the individual
right interpretation is how little attention its advocates pay to the
debates of either the Constitutional Convention or the First
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Congress.52  This is unsurprising. Although many concerns,
assumptions, and beliefs are imputed to the framers of both the
Constitution and the Second Amendment, there is virtually nothing in
the extant record of the in camera debates of 1787 and 1789 that
directly addresses the issues that lie at the core of our contemporary
controversy. Neither at Philadelphia nor New York would it have
occurred to anyone to ask whether adoption or amendment of the
Constitution would diminish the capacity of state and local
governments, in the exercise of their conventional police powers, to
impose legislative restrictions on the use or ownership of firearms.
That was not a concept that would have been easy to formulate in
either 1787 or 1789. Had the Convention wished to do so, it might, in
theory, have considered restricting the power of the state
governments to limit the fundamental right of bearing arms and
keeping in conjunction with the limitations on state authority found in
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution. But the framers had no
plausible, much less compelling, reason even to ask whether there
should be any change in the traditional legislative competence of the
states.
Similarly, the structure of debate in 1789 did not oblige the
members of the First Congress to consider the authority of the state
legislatures to regulate private use and ownership of weapons. The
entire thrust of that debate was directed to identifying powers of the
national government requiring moderation in the interest of
protecting the rights of either the people or the states. But any
prospect that the adoption of amendments would be used to protect
the people against both the national government and the states
evaporated when the Senate rejected James Madison's favorite
proposal to impose limitations on the states in the realms of freedom
of speech, religion, and trial by jury.53 The entire debate over the
Amendment in the House of Representatives is concerned with the
propriety of exempting religiously scrupulous persons from the
obligation to bear arms if summoned to do so-an issue completely
irrelevant to the current controversy over gun control, yet strongly
52. The debate at Philadelphia is completely ignored, for example, in HALBROOK, supra
note 5, which adroitly skips from provisions in the state constitutions to the ratification debate
without bothering to stop at Philadelphia. The Convention is similarly ignored in the leading
article by Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983). There is a brief but rather garbled discussion in
MALCOLM, supra note 25, at 152-55.
53. See 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: MARCH 4, 1789-MARCH 3, 1791, supra note 43, at 158.
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supportive of the idea that the Amendment was indeed about the
militia. Tenuous inferences about private rights may be drawn,
perhaps, from remarks made by a handful of representatives, but
none of these, again, confront the central issue directly.
Nevertheless, insofar as interpretation of the Second
Amendment is intertwined with the question of the status of the
militia under the Constitution, some guidance might be found in the
relevant debates on that subject at the Constitutional Convention,
principally the discussions of August 18 and 23, 1787. These debates
bear directly on one of the central assumptions undergirding the
individual right interpretation, which is that the word "militia" cannot
be narrowly defined as a "select militia," which would itself be
dangerous because it would be subject to the control of government,
but must instead be read broadly to embrace the entire adult male
population. In the most expansive reading, this militia forms
independently and spontaneously; it does not owe its existence to
state law; and it must therefore mean that "all of the people all of the
time (not just when called for organized militia duty) have a right to
keep arms. 5 4 The clear implication must be that the militia (in this
sense) has always existed, and will ever exist, as a popular institution
that precedes, and is immune to, both state and national law; it is, in
effect, a pre- and extraconstitutional body whose existence, even if
54. HALBROOK, supra note 5, at 8. Halbrook subsequently seems to describe the
formation of militia units in response to the crisis of 1774-75 as a spontaneous popular
development unconnected with structures of legal or political authority.
As the size and repressive character of the [British] standing army [in America]
increased, many Americans began to arm and to organize themselves into independent
militias. In 1774, George Mason and George Washington organized the Fairfax
County Militia Association, which was not subject to the control of the royal governor
and which in fact arose, in part, as a defense force against the regular militia.
Id. at 60. This regular militia was, however, apparently composed of equally patriotic Virginians
who were not inclined to turn out in support of Governor Dunmore, because, as Halbrook notes
two pages later, "the governor could not muster the regular Williamsburg militia against the
'Hanover independent militia company' led by Patrick Henry." Id. at 62. Or again: "for Mason
a 'well regulated militia' consisted in the body of the people organizing themselves into
independent companies, each member furnishing and keeping his own firearms, always ready to
resist the standing army of a despotic state." Id. at 61. But in fact, while what Charles Royster
called the "rage militaire" of this period clearly testified to the radical tenor of political
sentiment, the formation and invigoration of militia units took place in response to, and under
the guidance of, the provincial conventions that acted as the effective surrogate governments in
nearly all the colonies after the summer of 1774. See CHARLES ROYSTER, A REVOLUTIONARY
PEOPLE AT WAR: THE CONTINENTAL ARMY AND AMERICAN CHARACTER, 1775-1783, at 25
(1979). Thus when Mason and Washington formed "The Fairfax independant Company of
Voluntiers" in September 1774, these two members of the colony's governing elite were
implementing a recommendation of the Virginia Provincial Convention; its independence was
aimed against Governor Dunmore, the lawful commander of the militia, but not the
Convention, which was effectively acting as the real governing body of the colony. See 1 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 210-11 & note (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970).
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latent, is not constrained by law. Otherwise it could be reduced to the
dreaded modern incarnation of a select militia: a National Guard
composed of weekend warriors whose two weeks plus twelve
weekends of annual training efface their apparent status as citizen-
soldiers.
Whatever else might be said of this problematic definition of the
militia, it does not comport with the actual discussion of the subject at
Philadelphia. For as Madison's notes of the debates conclusively
demonstrate, that entire discussion explicitly recognized that the
militia was to be the joint object of congressional and state legislation.
What was at issue was where the boundary between national and
state responsibilities would lie. Nothing that was said during the
principal discussions of August 18 and 23, 1787 supports the
contention that the militia would henceforth exist as a spontaneous
manifestation of the community at large.
In the draft constitution submitted by the committee of detail on
August 6, the sole clause relating to the militia would have authorized
the national legislature "[t]o call forth the aid of the militia, in order
to execute the laws of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions."55 When the Convention reached
this clause on August 18, George Mason "moved as an additional
power 'to make laws for the regulation and discipline of the Militia of
the several States reserving to the States the appointment of the
Officers,"' which Mason justified on the grounds of the value of
"uniformity." 56  His motion was challenged by the Connecticut
delegate Oliver Ellsworth, who offered a substitute motion requiring
the militia to "have the same arms & exercise and be under rules
established by the Genl Govt. when in actual service of the U. States
and when States neglect to provide regulations for militia, it shd. be
regulated & established" by Congress.57 Ellsworth argued that the
states should not be deprived of their authority over the militia
because they "would pine away to nothing after such a sacrifice of
power. 5 8  By this, of course, he clearly meant that the state
governments would atrophy. That view was supported by John
Dickinson, who proposed a scheme whereby the national power to
discipline the militia would be limited to "one fourth part at a time,
55. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 182 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966).
56. Id. at 330.
57. Id. at 330-31.
58. Id. at 331.
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which by rotation would discipline the whole Militia."59 Mason took
this objection seriously enough to modify his original motion by
inserting the phrase, "not exceeding one tenth part in any one year,"
noting by way of introduction that this "suggested the idea of a select
militia." 60  But this amendment was in turn criticized by General
Charles Pinckney, John Langdon, and Madison, all arguing that there
were compelling reasons not to divide responsibility for the militia
between the national government and the states. In response,
Ellsworth dismissed "the idea of a select militia as impracticable. '61
After several further exchanges, the Convention referred both
versions of Mason's motion to a "grand Committee" (one delegate
from each state) it had just appointed.62
The committee's recommendation, delivered three days later,
was taken up on August 23. In revived form, the clause now read:
"To make laws for organizing, arming & disciplining the Militia, and
for governing such parts of them as may be employed in the service of
the U.S. reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the
officers, and authority of training the militia according to the
discipline prescribed. '63  The ensuing debate is noteworthy in two
respects. First, although three separate motions were introduced
during this debate to modify the committee's proposal-all in the
interest of confining the authority vested in Congress while enhancing
the authority reserved to the states-in the end, the Convention
rejected all three, thereby preserving the original language.64 Second,
in the course of this debate, several delegates made remarks that offer
revealing insight into the framers' deeper understanding of militia-
related issues. When, for example, Rufus King, speaking for the
committee, first explained that the national authority over "arming"
the militia meant "specifying the kind size and caliber of arms,"
Madison worried that this explanation "did not extend to furnishing
arms"; and King thereupon explained "that arming meant not only to
provide for uniformity of arms, but included authority to regulate the
59. Id.
60. Id. at 330-31. Madison's notes make Mason's reference to the select militia slightly
ambiguous; the relevant passage reads: "Mr. Mason-had suggested the idea of a select militia."
This seems to be a response to Dickinson, but it is possible that Mason meant that he, too, had
that idea originally in mind.
61. Id. at 332.
62. Id. at 333.
63. Id. at 384-85.
64. The three motions came respectively from Roger Sherman, Jonathan Dayton, and
again from Ellsworth and Sherman; they can be found id. at 385-86.
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modes of furnishing, either by the militia themselves, the State
Governments, or the National Treasury. '65 While the first of these
alternatives suggests a private duty to obtain arms, as specified by
legal regulations, the latter obviously envisioned either the states or
the Union providing arms of their own lawful authority.
Whether any institution other than the national government
could be relied upon to keep the militia armed and disciplined,
however, was something that Madison and his colleague, Edmund
Randolph, very much doubted. "The States neglect their Militia
now," Madison observed, "and the more they are consolidated into
one nation, the less each will rely on its own interior provisions for its
safety & the less prepare its Militia for that purpose; in like manner as
the Militia of a State would have been still more neglected .... "66
Randolph endorsed this judgment a few minutes later, "observing
that the Militia were every where neglected by the State Legislatures,
the members of which courted popularity too much to enforce a
proper discipline. ' 67 So ardent was Madison for strong national
supervision of the militia that he subsequently moved, without
success, that the appointment of officers by the states should be
confined to those "under the rank of General officers," but the main
motion was ultimately approved without dissent.68
Why is it necessary to call attention to this debate or, conversely,
why do individual right writers say so little about it? Its significance
would seem so obvious as to require no notice. But in the strange
world of Second Amendment discourse, what is most obvious
sometimes requires the greatest emphasis.
For the framers of the Constitution, whose usage does have some
relevance to ascertaining the original intent underlying the document
they wrote, the word militia could no longer be unthinkingly or
automatically equated with the entire male population capable of
bearing arms. That definition certainly remained one of the options
from which they could choose, and some of their comments indicate
that some delegates still thought of the state militia in just these
terms. When Dickinson and Mason, for example, contemplated
rotating portions of the militia under federal discipline, they were
presumably imagining drawing on that larger pool. But that is not the
65. Id. at 385.
66. Id. at 387.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 388.
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point. What matters is that the framers, clearly reasoning on the basis
of hard-earned experience, saw the militia as an institution that would
henceforth be regulated through a combination of national and state
legislation firmly anchored in the text of the Constitution, rather than
some preexisting, preconstitutional understanding. Wherever the
exact balance between national and state responsibility would be
struck, the militia would always be subject to legislative regulation.
When the framers referred to the "states" in these debates, they were
always alluding to their governments, not the people at large. The
"authority of training the militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress" that the Constitution reserved to the states
was a power and responsibility of the state governments to implement
national law. Americans were still entitled to believe that, as a matter
of principle and policy, a militia "composed of the body of the
people" offered the safest alternative to a standing army, tyranny, or
any of a number of other evils, but that does not alter the
fundamental delegation of legal authority to the new Congress that
the framers understood they were proposing. The Militia Clause
itself, buttressed by the Necessary and Proper Clause, empowered
Congress, acting conjointly with the state legislatures, to decide what
form the American militia would henceforth take.
None of this carried any threat to existing private rights of gun
ownership, save, perhaps, in the eventuality that a crisis found the
nation poorly armed and legislation was required, as it had been in
the past, to bring firearms in all states of repair and disrepair out of
private hands so that they could be returned to active and effective
public service. But this history does call into question the idea,
seemingly central to the individual right argument, that the very
concept of the militia had an irrevocable, unalterable populist
meaning immune to lawful revision by Congress and the state
legislatures.
RATIFIER UNDERSTANDING
As is well known, Antifederalist criticisms of the Constitution
emphasized the danger that American liberties would face from a
consolidated national government that would not only possess both
the purse and the sword but itself face the daunting task of executing
its law across the broad and diverse expanses of an extended republic.
Nor is there any mystery as to where the fear of standing armies
originated: it was a legacy of the Radical or Real Whig tradition that
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so shaped eighteenth-century American political ideology, 69 and it
could be well documented by familiar references to both the military
rule which Cromwell had imposed on England in the 1650s and to the
later efforts of James II to use an army increasingly officered by Irish
Catholics as a domestic police force. Federalists answered the charge
that the new Constitution would both permit and require government
by a standing army in various ways. On prudential grounds, they
argued from both experience and even a priori principles that
national security would mean nothing if the new government was not
fully empowered to raise regular military forces. Nor would these
forces constitute a standing army in the rigorous sense of the term,
because the two-year limit on appropriations meant that a fresh
election of the people's immediate representatives would provide an
effective constitutional and political check.
Federalists tended to treat this charge with the same disdain that
they dismissed many Antifederalist criticisms. Hamilton's refutation
of the standing army allegation in The Federalist No. 24, for example,
is a sustained sortie in sarcasm.70 So, too, is his dismissal in The
Federalist No. 29 of the idea that it would be dangerous to rely upon a
"select" militia-the same institution which proponents of the
individual right interpretation insist Americans generally deemed to
be nearly as threatening as a standing army. As far as Hamilton
(framer, ratifier, and distinguished commentator on the Constitution,
as well as leading member of its first cabinet) was concerned, the only
good militia was a select militia. Indeed, Hamilton's discussion in this
essay, cast in the form of the advice he would give to a future
Congress, nicely captures the tension in Federalist thinking between
the received definition of the militia, on the one hand, and the
institution the new government should regulate, on the other.
Hamilton opens this passage by declaring that "The project of
disciplining all the militia of the United States is as futile as it would
be injurious, if it were capable of being carried into execution. '71 As
69. The locus classicus of this interpretation is BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (enlarged ed. 1992) (1967). The relation between
this ideology and American attitudes toward an armed citizenry was explored in two leading
articles: Lawrence Delbert Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right
to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. HIST. 22 (1984), and Robert E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the
Second Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599 (1982).
70. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton).
71. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 26, at 318, 320. As the editors note,
this essay was originally No. 35 in the newspaper publication, but became No. 29 in the first
bound edition, the M'Lean edition published in the spring of 1788. See id. at 318.
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used here, the phrase "all the militia" connotes the body of the
people; but Hamilton immediately proceeds to explain why the
inconvenience, cost, and sheer impracticality of training the entire
population make it desirable to form "a select corps of moderate
extent" who could provide the "well regulated militia" (a phrase
Hamilton uses) that the mass of the citizenry could never constitute. 72
A Hamiltonian gloss on the Second Amendment would presumably
equate the people whose arms-bearing right must be protected with
the militia that could be "well regulated" only if it was select.73
To examine Federalist rhetoric on the militia is to enter a
conceptual world where the attitudes and concerns that characterized
their opponents' mode of thought no longer unthinkingly apply.
Equally obviously, these differences also go far toward explaining
why the members of the First Federal Congress felt compelled to
include some provision-however vaguely worded-relating to the
militia in their proposed amendments. Yet it is no less obvious that
the ratification debates of 1787-88 did not directly implicate the
critical issues at stake today-the extent of national and state
authority to regulate the private use and ownership of firearms.
Again, we are left to draw inferences from scattered remarks that
were principally concerned with the respective powers of the national
and state governments in the regulation of the militia.
There is one conspicuous exception to this judgment: the oft-
quoted amendments published by the Antifederalist minority in the
Pennsylvania Ratification Convention which met at Harrisburg in
November 1787. Soundly outnumbered by a two-to-one ratio in the
convention, this minority had struggled to have its concerns taken
seriously by a Federalist majority anxious to promote the cause of
ratification elsewhere by gaining a quick and unequivocal decision in
favor of the Constitution.74 Federalists grudgingly listened to the
amendments their antagonists wished to propose, but refused not
only to consider them but even to allow them to be entered on the
convention's journals, forcing the minority to publish their proposals
in the form of a dissent. Two of the minority's fifteen proposed
amendments bear on the arms and militia issues:
7. That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of
72. Id. at 320.
73. It is worth noting that, in Hamilton's view, this select militia would still comprise
"citizens" linked in fellow feeling not to the dragoons of the national army but to their "fellow
citizens" in the states. Id.
74. RAKOVE, supra note 11, at 110-12, 116-18.
[Vol. 76:103
THE HIGHEST STAGE OF ORIGINALISM
themselves and their own state, or the United States, or for the
purpose of killing game; and no law shall be passed for disarming
the people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real
danger of public injury from individuals; and as standing armies in
the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be
kept up; and that the military shall be kept under strict
subordination to and be governed by the civil power.
8. The inhabitants of the several states shall have liberty to fowl and
hunt in seasonable times, on the lands they hold, and on all other
lands in the United States not enclosed, and in like manner to fish
in all navigable waters, and others not private property, without
being restrained therein by any laws to be passed by the legislature
of the United States.75
These statements appear to be by far the strongest affirmations of a
belief in a private right to own and use arms, to be rendered immune
to federal regulation; they also appear to be the only statements to
frame and affirm the right in this way; and they therefore are
vulnerable to the charge, among others, that these resolutions are the
exceptions that prove a different rule.
A number of qualifications make the probative value of these
resolutions doubtful. They were the work of a distinct minority
within the Pennsylvania convention, and in the ensuing tests of
strength in the first federal elections held a year later, Federalists
swept the delegation that Pennsylvania sent to the new Congress.
The resolutions say nothing at all (because there was no reason that
they should do so) about the state's power to regulate ownership and
use of firearms-a power that the state had in fact already exercised. 6
While the resolutions articulate a fear of national power, they do not
identify the provisions of the Constitution that threatened private
rights of ownership, much less the fowling and hunting practices of
residents of a state in which the federal government could have no
valid title to any land.77 Nor did the minority members offer any
further explanation of the source of their fear when they published
their explanatory Address and Reasons of Dissent two weeks after the
convention adjourned. 78 Interestingly, that Address overlooked the
75. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 597-
98, 623-24 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
76. See the discussion in Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard
Model, the Second Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional
Theory, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 221, 228-37 (1999).
77. The state's western boundary marked the easternmost boundary of the national
domain created by the process of state cessions completed in 1784.
78. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of
Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, PA. PACKET AND DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 18, 1787,
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right to bear arms when it turned to discussing the most important
rights to be secured by "the emission of a BILL of RIGHTS."7 9
When the dissenters addressed the militia issue at the very close of
their protest, they framed their challenge in terms not of private
rights of ownership, but rather of the danger that Congress would
abuse its power over the militia by subjecting its members to martial
law, trampling on the rights of those "conscientiously scrupulous of
bearing arms," and marching its members near and far in the cause of
"riveting the chains of despotism on their fellow citizens, and on one
another."80 Finally, it was exactly these resolutions that inspired the
Federalist writer Noah Webster to jestingly propose a further
"restriction: 
-'That Congress shall never restrain any inhabitant of
America from eating and drinking, at seasonable times, or prevent his
lying on his left side, in a long winter's night, or even on his back,
when he is fatigued by lying on his right."'1 Was this really the kind
of right, Webster insinuated, deserving national constitutional pro-
tection?
Had Antifederalists elsewhere rallied around this early
expression of the extent of the right to bear arms, our current debate
would arguably not have to rely on far less direct or salient data.
Instead, we are left to wrestle with the implications of statements that
are far more concerned with the familiar juxtaposition of standing
army and militia than with the nature, source, and extent of private
rights or the limitations upon state legal regulation. Prominent
among these more direct comments is a remark made by George
Mason during the Virginia Ratification Convention, which advocates
of the individual right interpretation often cite as a succinct
endorsement of the equation permanently identifying the militia with
the people. "[W]ho are the militia?" Mason asked on June 14, 1788.
"They consist now of the whole people, except a few public
officers. 82
One is not surprised that Mason's very next sentences disappear
from the citations of writers like Kates and Halbrook:
reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 75, at 617.
79. Id. at 630-31.
80. Id. at 637-39.
81. Noah Webster, writing as "America," N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 31, 1787,
reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 26, at 199.
82. 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 39, at 1312.
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But I cannot say who will be the militia of the future day. If that
paper on the table [the Constitution] gets no alteration, the militia
of the future day may not consist of all classes, high and low, and
rich and poor; but may be confined to the lower and middle classes
of the people, granting exclusion to the higher classes of the
people.83
As far as Mason was concerned, amendments which did not reach the
power of Congress to regulate the militia would be unavailing,
because the composition of the militia would be subject to legislative
revision. Nor does this crucial point exhaust the importance of
Mason's observation, because once his speech is firmly located in the
context in which it was made, it supports conclusions rather at odds
with the self-reaffirming pronouncements that individual right
advocates customarily make.
When Mason spoke, he was not, of course, anticipating our
controversy but participating in a debate of his own day; if we are to
understand the force of his remarks, we have to know what was under
discussion in that debate. Mason was speaking near the end of a two-
day debate on the militia clauses of the Constitution (though here, as
on other occasions at Richmond, the pyrotechnics of Patrick Henry
occasionally led discussion to veer in strange directions). Given that
both Federalists and Antifederalists discussed the conditions under
which the militia could be disarmed, it might seem surprising that the
scholarly literature has slighted this debate. 84 But the surprise quickly
dissipates when one understands the assumptions that united
speakers from both sides.
When debate began on Saturday, June 14, the first point
discussed was the role the militia might be asked to play in enforcing
law and suppressing insurrections. In the midst of his lengthy first
speech on this subject, which quickly reached the danger of a standing
army, Mason warned about the danger that the militia might be
abolished. Should the national government ever "attempt to harass
and abuse the militia," Mason warned,
they may easily abolish them, and raise a standing army in their
stead. There are various ways of destroying the militia. A standing
army may be perpetually established in their stead. ... The militia
may be here destroyed by that method which has been practised in
83. Id. For truncated citations, see HALBROOK, supra note 5, at 74; Kates, supra note 7, at
216 n.51; Levinson, supra note 3, at 647.
84. One noteworthy exception is Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second
Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309 (1998), which uses this debate, however, primarily to




other parts of the world before. That is, by rendering them useless,
by disarming them. Under various pretences, Congress may
neglect to provide for arming and disciplining the militia, and the
State Governments cannot do it, for Congress has an exclusive right
to arm them, &c.... Should the national Government wish to
render the militia useless, they may neglect them, and let them
perish, in order to have a pretence of establishing a standing army.85
Mason reminded the delegates that forty years earlier, just such a
sinister scheme had been proposed by Governor Keith of
Pennsylvania, "to disarm the people" in order to "enslave them," but
not to "do it openly"-presumably by confiscating their weapons-
"but to weaken them and let them sink gradually, by totally disusing
and neglecting the militia." 86 Mason's wish, therefore, was to obtain
"an express declaration, that the State Governments might arm and
discipline" the militia should Congress fail to do so.87 He further
warned that the national government might destroy the militia by
using its disciplinary power to make service in the militia so "odious
to the people themselves ... as to make them cry out, Give us a
standing army."88
Mason was answered by Madison, who argued that the power to
arm the militia would in fact remain a "concurrent" one, shared
between the national government and the states. National
responsibility was essential, Madison suggested, because experience
demonstrated "that while the power of arming and governing of the
militia has been solely vested in the State Legislatures, they were
neglected and rendered unfit for immediate service."89  Madison's
notion of concurrent powers in turn drew a strong rebuttal from
Patrick Henry, who asserted that congressional power over the militia
was exclusive, not concurrent. If it were really concurrent, Henry
85. 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 39, at 1270-71.
86. Id. at 1271.
87. Id. For the identification of Keith, see id. at 1298 n.11.
88. Id. at 1272. Mason's general argument echoes one made by Luther Martin, the
Maryland delegate who left the Constitutional Convention prior to adjournment and who
subsequently opposed ratification. Martin complained that the Constitution would "enable the
government totally to discard, render useless, and even disarm the militia, when it would
remove them out of the way of opposing its ambitious views." Luther Martin, To the Citizens of
Maryland, MD. J., March 18, 1788, in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION 419 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986). The national
government, he continued, has "the powers, by which only the militia can be organized and
armed, and by the neglect of which they may be rendered utterly useless and insignificant, when
it suits the ambitious purposes of government." Id.
89. 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 39, at 1273.
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reasoned, the militia would wind up "doubly armed." 9 This would
impose a double set of costs on the militia, Henry warned; yet he also
reasoned from experience in terms that strongly echoed Madison.
"Every one who is able may have a gun," Henry observed. 91 "But
have we not learned by experience, that necessary as it is to have
arms, and though our Assembly has, by a succession of laws for many
years, endeavoured to have the militia completely armed, it is still far
from being the case? '92 In his view, the proper remedy was to
empower Congress to arm the militia only after "the States shall have
refused or neglected to do it." 93
Subsequent speakers returned to the question of determining
how the militia had actually been armed in the past or might best be
armed in the future. "But it is said, the militia are to be disarmed,"
the Federalist delegate George Nicholas observed.94 "Will they be
worse armed than they are now?" 95 Madison was correct to argue for
a concurrent power, Nicholas continued,
For the power of arming them rested in the State Governments
before, and although the power be given to the General
Government, yet it is not given exclusively. For, in every instance,
where the Constitution intends that the General Government shall
exercise any power exclusively of the State Governments, words of
exclusion are particularly inserted.96
Following this speech, the debate took one of its periodic flights away
from the specific clause ostensibly under discussion. When the militia
came back into view some time later, Mason repeated his charge that
Congress would use its disciplinary power to impose "such
severities... on the militia, as would make them wish the use of
militia to be utterly abolished; and assent to the establishment of a
standing army."97 But then Mason, too, veered off to other issues,
even surviving a call to order to keep him on point.
We should not be surprised that advocates of the individual right
interpretation pay so little attention to these exchanges, because they
demonstrate, first and foremost, that leading Federalists and
Antifederalists alike assumed that the real problem was to determine




94. Id. at 1280.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1289.
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which level of government should be responsible for making sure that
the militia was properly armed. George Mason's notion of how the
citizenry might be disarmed did not presuppose that federal agents
would come gently rapping on farmhouse doors, confiscating
weapons and leaving the people evermore unable to thwart the
tyrannical designs of their ambitious masters. Rather, the national
government would disarm the citizenry simply by failing to provide
them with the arms that in fact they rarely possessed or managed to
maintain. The preferred Antifederalist alternative was not to allow
citizens to acquire weapons on their own; it was rather to shift the
burden of supporting the militia to the state governments. But in
either case, the militia would clearly remain an institution created and
regulated by government. And its effectiveness would depend not on
a citizenry already well armed with their own weapons, but on the
capacity of government to provide and maintain weapons that the
people evidently lacked.
Had this debate been confined to this issue alone, it would
already suggest some serious deficiencies in the individual right
account. But the discussion which resumed on Monday, June 16, is
also revealing in another respect closely related to our modern
controversy. For now, with Henry palpably struggling to stick to his
subject, discussion turned to the role of the militia in suppressing
insurrection and the matter of concurrent national and state powers.
In Henry's curious view, seconded by William Grayson," that power
"was exclusively given to Congress. If it remained in the States it was
by implication." 99  Habituated as they were to his distortions,
Federalist speakers found this point hard to swallow. John Marshall
even "asked if Gentlemen were serious" in these assertions, when
"the least attention" would demonstrate their errors.1°° The state
governments had always possessed these powers, and nothing in the
Constitution deprived them of their original authority to use the
militia for their own purposes, except in those specified cases when
98. Id. at 1305-06.
99. Id. at 1304-05. Grayson went on to repeat the idea that Congress might be free to
"entirely neglect" arming the militia in particular states. Id. at 1306. This in turn led him to
distinguish the deprived situation of the militia in Scotland and Ireland from that in England,
which had "an excellent militia law.., such as I wish to be established by the General
Government." And what did this mean in practice? "They have 30,000 select militia in
England," Grayson noted approvingly. Id. Of course, according to individual right advocates,
the idea of a select militia is exactly what Americans were supposed to revile. Unfortunately,
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Congress could legally call the militia into federal service. 10' State
governments would have every right to call out their militia to
suppress insurrections, whether emanating from the enslaved element
of their populations (who would certainly have enjoyed a natural
right to obtain arms for their self-preservation, but whose access to
arms was carefully restricted by law) or any other source of
disaffection. But again, what was at stake in this debate was the
question of which level of government should be empowered to use
the militia to suppress insurrections, not the specter that the
Constitution would make it impossible for a privately armed people
to rise up against either national or state oppressors. It was in this
context that Mason asked whether a militia which consisted "now of
the whole people" would preserve that character in the future.102 But
here his express concern was not with the danger of the people
disarmed, much less of federal confiscation of private weapons, but
rather to exempt the militia from the "ignominious punishments and
heavy fines" that he expected would be imposed by a Congress too
"small, and inadequate" in number to have any "fellow-feeling for the
people."103
Locating Mason's remark in the context in which it was uttered,
then, brings us into a world of assumptions very different from the
selective and anachronistic ones that polemicists now choose to
impose upon it. In this world, disarming the militia meant that the
government would fail to supply its members with firearms they had
little private reason to keep, not sending the lackeys of power out to
haul in rusty fowling pieces that would probably not fire in any case,
and which one would not bear into combat against better armed
regular troops. In this world, every male citizen might well be eligible
for militia service, but the militia was an institution legally created by
government, not some pre- or extraconstitutional entity immune to
legal regulation. In this world, what was under debate was not the
need to protect a right to revolution but a debate about federalism-
that is, a debate about the respective competence and authority of the
national and state governments. And in this world, too, the
suspicions that Antifederalists like Mason and Henry voiced only
illustrated the deeper deficiencies in their case against the
Constitution.
101. Id. at 1306-07.




One encounters similar misrepresentations of context in other
treatments of leading statements from the ratification period. Among
these, the most important is the use made of James Madison's paean
to the militia in The Federalist No. 46.104 Rare is the individual-right
exposition which does not cite Madison's prediction that any attempt
by a standing army to impose tyranny "would be opposed [by] a
militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their
hands." 105 It was to "be doubted," Madison continued, "whether a
militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a
proportion of regular troops" as the national government could
plausibly acquire. °6 And then Madison went on to remind his readers
of "the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over
the people of almost every other nation," and which stood them in
sharp contrast to the monarchies of Europe, which "are afraid to trust
the people with arms."107
We should not be surprised to discover that these vintage
snippets are often presented independently of the larger argument
they are meant to support and indeed of the very sentences in which
they are embedded. Madison's purpose in this essay (and the
preceding Federalist No. 45) was to compare the relative advantages
that the national and state governments would enjoy in the zero-sum
competition for power that Antifederalists believed the Constitution
would launch, and which they further predicted would end in the
consolidation of all real authority in the Union while the states
withered away as effective jurisdictions of governance.1°8 Nowhere in
these essays did Madison address, much less defend, the idea that the
armed citizenry consisting of the body of the population would be
called upon to resist the oppression emanating from the national and
state governments in collusion. Instead, his concern throughout was
to explain why the political affections and institutional resources that
the state governments would command would render any real danger
of the erosion of their authority unlikely-including the worst case
scenario of military despotism that he then deemed improbable to the
point of absurdity.0 9
104. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 26, at 492.
105. Id. at 492.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 493.
108. As I have argued elsewhere, the fear of consolidation was the great controlling theme
in Antifederalist polemics. See RAKOVE, supra note 11, at 148-49, 181-88.
109. It took a lot to get Madison to crank out a truly pungent phrase, but here he observed
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The militia was one of those resources that would rally to the
support of state government, as (surprise!) the sentences from which
his most frequently quoted phrases are extracted (or wrenched) make
clear. Thus the sentence in which the reference to half a million
armed citizens appears continues: "officered by men chosen from
among themselves, fighting for their common liberties" -which are
presumably invested in the autonomy of their state governments-
and most important, "united and conducted by governments
possessing their affections and confidence," the political ingredients
that Madison understood would best determine the outcome of
whatever rivalry existed between the two levels of American
federalism. 11° Similarly, the sentence distinguishing Americans from
other peoples begins with the phrase "Besides the advantage of being
armed," and then concludes by noting
the existence of subordinate governments [that is, the states] to
which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are
appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprizes of ambition,
more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any
form [that is, a unified nation-state, whether absolutist like France
or parliamentary like Britain] can admit of."'
So, too, the thought that other peoples might be less tyrannized if
they were possessed of arms is a prelude to a further comment on the
advantages of federalism:
But were the people to possess the additional advantages of local
governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the national
will, and direct the national force; and of officers appointed out of
the militia, by these governments and attached both to them and to
the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance, that the
throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned, in
spite of the legions which surround it.112
Nowhere does Madison treat the idea of an armed citizenry existing
independently of any government as the best deterrent against
despotism; rather, his argument throughout rests on the supposition
that the militia is an institution of government, subject to its legal
regulation, and the greater likelihood that the members of this militia
will commit their affections and loyalty to repel any "projects of
that these descriptions of a tyranny imposed by military despotism were "more like the
incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal,




112. Id. at 493.
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ambition" that the national government might undertake to pursue
the "downfal[l] of the State Governments.""' 3  Tyranny in the
compound republic of the United States would not take the form of a
joint national-state assault on the liberties of the people. Rather, it
would necessarily involve an effort by the national government to
encroach upon the rights and powers of the states; and should this
encroachment take place without the approval of the people's
representatives, the state governments would serve as the rallying
point for resistance.
For a final example, consider the treatment of the militia
question by the writer known as the Federal Farmer, usually
identified in the current historical literature as Melancton Smith, the
moderate Antifederalist who eventually cooperated in securing
ratification by the New York convention in which Federalists were a
distinct minority. In his eighteenth and final letter, the Farmer
includes the Mason-like statement that "A militia, when properly
formed, are in fact the people themselves, and render regular troops
in a great measure unnecessary."11 4  Halbrook, though mistakenly
identifying the Farmer with Richard Henry Lee, quotes at length
from this essay, which includes an important discussion of the
difference between a general militia composed of the body of the
people and the select militia which might turn into a tool of power."5
But again, the omissions are revealing. Like Madison in The
Federalist No. 46, the Farmer poses the problem as one of allocating
powers over the militia between two levels of government. His
definition of the militia is preceded by this statement of the problem:
"in a federal republic, where the people meet in distinct assemblies,
many stipulations are necessary to keep a part from transgressing,
113. Id. at 492-93. For representative examples of partial quotations, see HALBROOK, supra
note 5, at 67-68; Kates, supra note 7, at 228.
114. Letter from the Federal Farmer (Jan. 25, 1788), in 17 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 362 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino
eds., 1995).
115. HALBROOK, supra note 5, at 70-72. Halbrook notes that "most of Lee's proposals [that
is, the Federal Farmer's] ... were subsequently adopted in the Bill of Rights, and some with
almost identical wording," but in fact the Letters from the Federal Farmer contain no such draft
of a bill of rights. On the other hand, as a member of the Continental Congress reviewing the
Constitution in late September 1787, Lee had in fact attempted to append a declaration of
rights, but his articles contained no mention of the right to bear arms. The only relevant
proposal in Lee's draft amendments was a statement "[t]hat standing Armies in times of peace
are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be permitted unless assented to by two thirds of the
Members composing each House of the legislature under the new constitution." 13 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 239 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981). On Lee's efforts to secure amendments, see
RAKOVE supra note 11, at 108-110.
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which would be unnecessary checks against the whole met in one
legislature, in one entire government.' 1 6 The issue, again, was a
matter of allocating powers within a structure of federalism, not of
defining private rights. Moreover, in discussing the advantages of a
general militia over a select militia, the Farmer actually winds up
arguing against the idea that the militia should consist of the entire
population. His own idea, the Farmer writes, was that "the federal
head may prescribe a general uniform plan, on which the respective
states shall form and train the militia, appoint their officers and solely
manage them, except when called into the service of the union." '117
Such an "arrangement," he continues,
places the sword in the hands of the solid interest of the
community, and not in the hands of men destitute of property, of
principle, or of attachment to the society and government, who
often form the select corps of peace or ordinary establishments: by
it, the militia are the people, immediately under the management of
the state governments, but on a uniform federal plan .... 118
In this analysis, it turns out, there are two kinds of select militia,
neither of which comprises the whole body of the people. A
nationally organized select militia would likely draw upon the worst
elements of society, the dregs who formed the feared regular troops
of European monarchies; while a state-based select militia (here
equated with "the people") would consist of the solid citizens, to the
exclusion of the same untrustworthy elements who could not be
counted upon to maintain the social order. And in both cases, the
Federal Farmer constructs his argument within a matrix of federalism;
he never posits the distinction between government (whether national
or state) and population on which the individual right interpretation
relies.
Beyond illustrating the propensity of individual right writers to
truncate quotations mercilessly, the consideration of these debates
and texts demonstrates that the discussions of 1787-88 were
preoccupied with the question of the militia, and that this question
was addressed almost exclusively under the rubric of federalism.
Whether there was, or should be, a private, constitutionally
sanctioned right to own and use firearms was simply not at issue. The
rhetoric of ratification certainly included many statements from both
sides on the advantages of a well regulated militia as a valuable
116. Letter from the Federal Farmer (Jan. 25, 1788), supra note 114, at 362.
117. Id. at 362-63.
118. Id. at 363.
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alternative to a standing army, but such statements did not require
either side to reach the question of the nature and extent of the
private rights of ownership and use, much less the question of the
power of the states to legislate should the use of firearms prove
inimical to the health and welfare of society. No one on either side
would have denied that individuals had a private legal right to the
ownership of weapons, but the structure of debate neither
encouraged nor required anyone to ask whether a constitutional right
or duty linked to service in the militia could prevail over matters
concerning the internal police of the states-a responsibility that
would clearly fall under the reserved powers of the states soon to be
recognized in the Tenth Amendment. Both Federalists and
Antifederalists, however, did appear to agree on one crucial point:
the militia was an institution subject to the legislative control of one
level of government or another.
INTELLECTUAL LEGACIES
Once one grasps how little substantive support the individual
right theory derives from the records of debate in 1787-89, it becomes
easier to understand why its advocates spend so little time
reconstructing these debates, but instead rely on that mode of
originalist reasoning that emphasizes the influence of preexisting
intellectual traditions. Because those debates did not directly or
significantly address the question of whether the new government
would be empowered to regulate private ownership of firearms,
proponents of the individual right interpretation necessarily turn to
those sources that can be read to suggest that a general belief in the
liberty-securing advantages of private ownership was so deeply
grounded in eighteenth-century Anglo-American political and legal
culture as to undergird and inform all discussion of the question. As
Joyce Malcolm suggests, the key clues to unlocking the meaning of
the Second Amendment lie in "the English legacy," as it was
absorbed and expanded upon by the American colonists and
revolutionaries. "The English model was constantly before the
framers of the American Constitution," Malcolm observes. 119 The
Americans faced daunting challenges, but
Happily, English strategies for prudent control of the sword were
ready to hand. When delegates copied English policies the public
was reassured. When they departed from them there was grave
119. MALCOLM, supra note 25, at 150.
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concern, which was not allayed until the passage of the Second
Amendment brought the American system more into line with
English practice. Here, then, is the key to the meaning and intent
of the much-misunderstood Second Amendment. 120
One is only left to wonder how Americans coped with the other
departures from English practice that the Constitution embodied.
Presumably Antifederalists would have been even more assured had
the framers of the Constitution restored monarchy and created an
American nobility.
There is, of course, nothing unique about this effort to locate the
ideas, great and small, of American constitutionalism within larger
intellectual contexts. An enormous literature describes the influence
on American thinking of a host of traditions, ranging from knowledge
of the writings of antiquity, in which all learned men were versed, to
the latest discoveries of Newtonian physics and Lockean psychology,
with ample room for any of a number of other political, religious,
historical, economic, and even literary modes of thought. Yet even if
we concede that different facets of American constitutionalism
reflected one or more or all of these legacies, traditions, and
discourses, the formidable task remains of explaining exactly how
these background beliefs attained dispositive constitutional authority
under the conditions of debate and decision prevailing between 1787
and 1791. It is one thing, after all, to say that a particular belief or
opinion or attitude was part of the Zeitgeist, but another matter
entirely to assay its interpretative authority. Nor is this a problem
unique in any way to the Second Amendment. It is in fact a
fundamental problem in writing the intellectual history of the
Constitution to know how to correlate the received wisdom that
shaped the general parameters of political thinking with the particular
decisions on numerous provisions that had to be taken as American
constitutionalism embarked on its inventive, radically textual course.
One can posit, for example, that Locke exerted a pervasive influence
over American ideas about the right of resistance, education, and
epistemology-but with the exception of the Religion Clause and the
Just Compensation Clause, one would be hard pressed to fashion a
Lockean interpretation of any provision of the Constitution.
Montesquieu's theory of the separation of powers exerted enormous
influence over American thinking, as evidenced by the formulaic
restatement of the theory found in the early state constitutions and
120. Id. at 151.
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declarations of rights. Yet as any reader of The Federalist No. 47
knows, one can only understand the sense that Americans made of
this theory-either in 1776 or 1787-by reconstructing the varied
ways in which the framers of their constitutions tried to apply his
"doctrine" (if that is even the right term for it).121
Consider the problems that Malcolm encounters in the
concluding chapter of her recent book on the subject, which is
devoted primarily to examining the English background to American
practice. Taking Malcolm seriously requires an immediate sus-
pension of disbelief, for neither the language of the Bill of Rights of
1689 nor the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy readily supports
the idea that the subject's right to have arms lay beyond the sphere of
legislative regulation.1 2  Malcolm suggests that the reported
popularity of William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of
England in the colonial market means that the colonists also accepted
(lock, stock, and barrel, so to speak) his passing comment on the
value of the "auxiliary right" of subjects having "arms for...
defence."'123  But one cannot implicitly assume that Blackstone's
general popularity made his position authoritative on every point; if it
had, the colonists would have had to fold their constitutional tents in
the face of Blackstone's assertion of parliamentary supremacy.
Moreover, Blackstone's own language can be read just as easily-
arguably more so-to support the power of legislative regulation.
The subjects' right must be "suitable to their condition and degree,
and such as are allowed by law," and it is further characterized as "a
public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of
resistance and self-preservation. '124 Nothing in this language could
plausibly be read to establish a private right immune to legislative
regulation. Nor does the allusion to a natural right operate as a
similar prohibition. It was, after all, one of the great commonplaces
of eighteenth-century rights talk to observe that natural rights are
always modified by the terms of the social compact. Anglo-
Americans operated in a political and legal culture that was deeply
121. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison), in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 26, at 499.
122. "Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their
Conditions and as allowed by Law." DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 7 (1689). The Declaration
may be found in Lois G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689, at 295 (1981).
123. See MALCOLM, supra note 25, at 142-43 (citation omitted). Blackstone's comments
may be found in 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A
FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765-1769, at 139 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1979).
124. Id.
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respectful of the natural right of property, but that did not prevent
legislatures on both sides of the Atlantic from imposing taxes and
other regulations of the rights of property in the normal exercise of
their power.'l '
Once Malcolm reaches American shores, the problematic nature
of her argument becomes even more evident. Legislation requiring
various groups of colonists (primarily in the seventeenth century) to
carry arms does not establish the existence of a late-eighteenth-
century right lying beyond legislative regulation; and in any case, a
legislature that can require arms to be carried in the interest of
intimidating slaves and Indians can also prohibit the same act in the
name of public security.126 Nor does repetition of the hackneyed
point that the colonists freely shared an English fear of standing
armies even begin to identify the limits on legislative regulation.
Malcolm documents the claim that Americans "were also alert to the
dangers of a 'select militia"' with a single, rather vague reference to a
1773 sermon. 127  Only one of the state declarations of rights
(Pennsylvania) adopted in the early years of independence asserted a
right to bear arms for self-defense, as well as the common defense; 128
and only the Virginia declaration qualified its reference to the militia
with the apposite phrase, "composed of the body of the people.' 12 9
Not to worry, however, Malcolm assures us. Even those states "which
failed to mention a right to have arms for individual defence" must
have intended to endorse a general militia.10 And how do we know
this? "Because of their long-standing prejudice against a select militia
as constituting a form of standing army liable to be skewed politically
and dangerous to liberty, every state had created a general militia.' 131
Moreover, "the individual's right to be armed, where not specifically
mentioned, is unmistakably assumed.' 132 And how do we know this?
Because the broad statement of the usual trinity of natural rights,
including the right "of enjoying and defending life and liberty" or
"obtaining happiness and safety" would be meaningless "if citizens
125. See the useful summary of this point in FORREST MCDONALD, NOvuS ORDO
SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 10-36 (1985).
126. See MALCOLM, supra note 25, at 138-41.
127. Id. at 142.
128. See 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 7 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
129. Id. at 3.
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were deprived of the right to be armed. '133
This is less an argument from ample historical evidence than a
faulty syllogism resting on questionable premises and circular
reasoning. At crucial junctures in her argument-when one has to
ask, just how was the English legacy translated into American
practice -Malcolm resorts to such vaguely asserted forms of evidence
as "long-standing prejudice," things that are "unmistakably
assumed,"' 13 4 and the abiding influence of Blackstone's statement
about the danger of "oppression,"' 13  typically omitting his
qualifications subjecting possession and use of arms to legal
restriction. 136 These are assertions rather than demonstrations; they
establish only that such familiar themes as the fear of standing armies
and the belief in a natural right of self-defense were part of the
universe of political attitudes shared by eighteenth-century
Americans. They do not explain, however, how much interpretative
weight these preexisting "attitudes, prejudices, and policies"' 37 can
bear when we try to determine what the adopters of the Second
Amendment thought they were doing, much less why the principles
so loosely stated there should trump either existing understandings of
the legislative powers of the states or the relevant textual provisions
of the federal Constitution.
What the individual right interpretation establishes, then, is
something less than meets the eye. Did Americans in general believe
or affirm the value of an armed citizenry? Of course they did, and in
doing so, they freely invoked images made familiar by the common
radical Whig reading of history. Was this belief part of the
intellectual currency which shaped the general discussion of issues
relating to the standing army, the militia, and the respective authority
of the national and state governments? Of course it was. But did
Federalists and Antifederalists agree about the relative importance of
an armed citizenry in promoting the future welfare of the United
States? Of course they did not. For Antifederalists, the appeal to the
armed citizenry was meant as an alternative to the substantive
provisions of the Constitution which threatened the creation of a
standing army that would command obedience at the point of a
133. Id. at 149.
134. Id. at 148.
135. Id. at 145.
136. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 123, at 139, and accompanying text.
137. ld. at 162.
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bayonet. 38 For Federalists, by contrast, the presumed existence of an
armed citizenry offered yet another reason to dismiss Antifederalist
predictions of tyranny as so many phantasms of their opponents'
overheated imaginations.
Yet even if one recognizes that this belief remained part of the
political culture of the late 1780s, a critical problem persists: how
would the legal authority of the states to regulate the use and
ownership of firearms be affected or altered by a constitutional
provision understood as a restriction on the authority of the national
government? If the colonies and states had previously exercised
jurisdiction in this area, as they demonstrably had, and if the logic of
the Antifederalist position was to enhance the authority of the state
governments vis-A-vis that of the new national government, what
difference would the adoption of the Second Amendment make to
the reserved powers of the states? A belief in the value of an armed
citizenry is consistent with a view of the Second Amendment as an
injunction to the federal government not to rely solely on its own
army, but to continue to keep the militia well armed and disciplined.
It could similarly be read as a reminder to the state governments of
their responsibility not to depend solely on federal largesse (funded
mandates, in effect) to perform their duty to maintain their militia,
especially to counteract the danger of domestic insurrection. But
there is no evidence that the generalized belief in the armed citizenry
distilled in the Second Amendment was understood to be the
equivalent of an Article I, Section 10 restriction on the legislative
authority of the states.
LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE
This reliance on intellectual sources of American attitudes is the
more striking when it is set against a final category of evidence that
the individual right interpretation seems reluctant to embrace: the
lessons learned by the experience of the Revolutionary War, or more
generally, from the departures in constitutional thinking and practice
to which the Revolution gave rise. Put simply, the individual right
interpretation is an argument against change, and is in that sense
138. As Michael Bellesiles notes, perhaps the most important development in the battlefield
use of firearms in the eighteenth century came when the Duke of Cumberland realized the
advantage of affixing a socket bayonet to the end of a musket, enabling soldiers to fire (or
receive) a single volley, and then charge the enemy to inflict more devastating casualties with
the blade than they could ever attain with the ball. See MICHAEL A. BELLESILES, ARMING
AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL GUN CULTURE 144-46 (2000).
20001
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
fundamentally ahistorical. It assumes that a body of writings
absorbed by Americans prior to 1776 was completely formative of
how they thought after 1776; the principles ostensibly laid down in
Cato's Letters and the other supposed sources remained
determinative of American thinking through 1789 (and beyond).
Nothing that intervened in the form of experience and experiment
could alter or diminish the weight of that received authority. By
contrast, the interpretation of the Second Amendment that anchors
its meaning in the immediate debates of the late 1780s, and especially
in the specific issue of the militia, presupposes that fundamental
changes in American thinking had begun to develop since 1776. The
rhetorical deference that Federalist writers sometimes paid to
traditional concepts (like the value of an armed citizenry) could not
disguise the self-consciously empirical and experimental qualities of
mind that distinguished the proponents of constitutional reform from
its antagonists. Antifederalists may have been men of little faith in
the Constitution because they remained all too faithful to ideas that
may have carried them into revolution in 1776, but which experience
had since rendered problematic if not indeed obsolete.139 In this view,
the debate over the militia cannot be explained merely by reference
to Machiavelli, or Trenchard and Gordon, or Blackstone. Authority
unconfirmed or actively challenged by events was no longer binding;
it could only be weighed in the light of events and experience. Or to
put the point more directly: Their ideas (like ours) were shaped not
only by what they read, but also (and arguably more powerfully) by
what they did or had done to them.14° Thinking of the origins of the
139. On this general point, compare BAILYN, supra note 69, with the classic essay by Cecelia
M. Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative
Government, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1955). See also RAKOVE, supra note 11, at 149-60. There
is an extensive scholarly literature which seeks to differentiate Federalists and Antifederalists in
terms of qualities of mind, attitudes toward change, and the capacity (we might now say) to
think "outside the box" of received authority.
140. For an illustration of this point, consider this passing comment by Levinson, alluding to
an observation made by the distinguished historian, Edmund Morgan: "Morgan argues,
incidentally, that the armed yeomanry was neither effective as a fighting force nor particularly
protective of popular liberty, but that is another matter. For our purposes, the ideological
perceptions are surely more important than the 'reality' accompanying them." Levinson, supra
note 3, at 648 n.54. It may well be true that all our constructions of reality (whose existence I,
for one, do not doubt) are shaped by ideology, but what is at issue here is, I believe, a more
fundamental problem that has deeper echoes in the historiography of the Revolutionary era
more generally. No historian would deny that the legacy of radical Whig ideology was a major
element in American political thinking, both in 1776 and in 1787. Yet by the latter date,
experience (whose existence Levinson seems to posit as "reality") had called into question
many of the propositions that were stock elements of that ideology; and the framers of the
Constitution, as well as the Federalist majority who proposed the Second Amendment,
represented that portion of the spectrum of American political thinking who were now less
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Second Amendment within this context yields two major challenges
to the individual right interpretation, one of which (the more
familiar) can be labeled political, the other (and more recently
explored) behavioral.
The political context, which is principally identified with the
writings of the historians Lawrence Cress and Don Higginbotham,14" '
has already been implicated throughout this article. It suggests, quite
simply, that the real object of debate in the late 1780s was the militia,
and that thinking about the militia was now driven primarily by
lessons derived from the crucible of revolutionary conflict. That the
militia had served important functions in that war was not to be
denied, and recent historical scholarship has confirmed the point.142
But to say that the militia had been useful was not to say that national
defense could henceforth be allowed to rely upon it. Projects of
militia reform were supported by the retired commander in chief,
George Washington, and the new secretary of war, Henry Knox, in
the mid-1780s, but they fell victim to the desuetude of the Continental
Congress. The calling of the Constitutional Convention, however,
gave Washington and other like-minded men a new opportunity to
lay the necessary groundwork for the desired reforms, and the
resulting provisions of the Constitution reflected their desire.
Henceforth the militia would be an institution subject to substantial
national regulation, with the state governments sharing concurrent
responsibility for appointment of officers and the actual conduct of
training, and concurrent power to use these units, when not called
into national service, for their own lawful purposes (including, of
course, the suppression of insurrections by disaffected citizens
presumably exercising their natural right of revolution).
Nothing in the ensuing discussions of these proposals required or
even encouraged either Federalists or Antifederalists to consider the
matter of state or national regulation of the private ownership and
use of firearms. It follows that no coherent intentions or under-
standings can be confidently ascribed to a problem that was never
beholden to the received wisdom. That is, they were more inclined to test the ideological
inheritance against the lessons of recent experience. Far from this being, in Levinson's words,
"another matter," it lies at the heart of the question.
141. See Lawrence Delbert Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the
Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. HIST. 22 (1984); Don Higginbotham, The Federalized Militia
Debate: A Neglected Aspect of Second Amendment Scholarship, 55 WM. & MARY Q. 39 (1998).
142. See the brilliant essay by John Shy, The American Revolution: The Military Conflict
Considered As a Revolutionary War, in ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 121 (Stephen
G. Kurtz & James H. Hutson eds., 1973).
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cogently formulated in its own right. Whether or not individuals had
a right to own firearms free of regulation by the states was a matter of
complete indifference in 1787-89.
The behavioral context is most clearly associated with the work
of Michael Bellesiles, which will doubtless attract substantial notice
and scrutiny. Probing beyond the hackneyed paeans to American
sharpshooting that occur both in the primary sources (some of them
clearly contrived for European eyes)143 and in later writings, Bellesiles
is evidently the first historian to examine the actual use of firearms in
the colonial, Revolutionary, and post-Revolutionary eras.144 What he
discovers, among other things, is that many, perhaps the majority of
American households, did not possess firearms; that Americans
imported virtually all of their firearms; that the weapons they had
were likely to deteriorate rapidly, firearms being delicate
mechanisms, prone to rust and disrepair; that gunsmiths were few, far
between, and not especially skilled; that the militia were poorly
armed and trained, their occasional drilling days an occasion for
carousing rather than acquiring the military art; that Americans had
little use for hunting, it being much more efficient to slaughter your
favorite mammal grazing in the neighboring pasture or foraging in
nearby woods than to take the time to track some attractive haunch
of venison with a weapon that would be difficult to load, aim, and fire
before the fleshy object of your desire went bounding off for greener
pastures. (Trapping was much more efficient than hunting, and
hunting was a leisure activity for the elite.)145  All of these
considerations make plausible and explicable the concerns we have
already noted in describing the Virginia ratification debate of mid-
June 1788: that without a national government firmly committed to
the support of the militia, the institution would wither away from
inefficiency, indifference, and neglect (which is pretty much what
happened in any case, for reasons both Federalists and Antifederalists
readily foresaw). Americans of all political persuasions could pay
rhetorical lip service to the value of an armed citizenry, because that
143. One might express some skepticism about the accuracy of Jefferson's statement of
1778, when (in a letter to an Italian correspondent about music) he explained why he thought
American casualties might be half those of the British army: "This difference is ascribed to our
superiority in taking aim when we fire; every soldier in our army having been intimate with his
gun from his infancy." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Giovanni Fabbroni (June 8, 1778), in
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 760, 760 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
144. For a preliminary report of findings, see Michael A. Bellesiles, The Origins of Gun
Culture in the United States, 1760-1865, 83 J. AM. HIST. 425 (1996).
145. See BELLESILES, supra note 138,passim.
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sentiment was embedded in the traditions that the individual right
interpretation celebrates; but the reality was quite otherwise.
46
Bellesiles's findings, coupled with the evidence that militia
reform was indeed the object of debate, thus illustrate a fundamental
problem that all originalist inquiries must address. Once we move
beyond the immediate records of debate to reconstruct deeper
assumptions and concerns upon which they rested, originalists need to
assess the relative importance of two quite different sets of sources,
one consisting of intellectual traditions that doubtless shaped a
grammar of discussion, the other of a set of experiences that
fashioned an agenda for action. The tension between these two ways
of thinking would presumably operate at any period, but we have
good reason to think that it was felt more acutely during the
Revolutionary era, when Americans were deeply aware of the
fundamental break that their experiment in republican
constitutionalism was making with the received wisdom of the past.
This claim appears repeatedly in Federalist literature-including,
most notably, The Federalist-and it renders problematic the naive,
not to say ahistorical claim that underlies the approach taken by
Malcolm and other writers of the individual right school: that
transposition of the English experience or the authority of received
tradition fills in the silences in the evidentiary record. It may or it
may not; but the argument cannot stand on assertion alone. It
requires some comparison of received ideas and the lessons of
experience; but one searches the individual right literature in vain for
any sustained mention, much less discussion, of the immediate
concerns on which Americans were acting. In their account, the prior
conception of the militia rooted in tradition somehow trumps the
newer notions that the experience of the Revolution made more
urgent. That is an arguable conclusion, but if so, it must be argued-
and historical argument requires weighing conflicting evidence, not
accepting one source and discounting another.
A DECLARATORY RIGHT
Modern thinking about constitutional rights is powerfully and
indelibly shaped by the legacy of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
gradual development of the incorporation doctrine, the civil rights




that followed the landmark, rights-enlarging decisions of the Warren
and Burger Courts. The logic of the individual right interpretation of
the Second Amendment is deeply indebted to these developments in
three ways, two of which are fairly obvious, but the third rather more
subtle and even deceptive.
First, the rights revolution established the protection of
individual rights as the dominant paradigm governing our underlying
conception of the problem of rights in general, for it is the "no
person" who claims recognition under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment who has evolved
into the image of the "lone rights-bearer" lamented by Mary Ann
Glendon.147 It is the individual gun owner whose right is perceived to
be the endangered object of legislative restriction.
Second, the incorporation doctrine makes the actions of state
and local legislative bodies restricting the exercise of federally
sanctioned rights subject to judicial review. Its incomplete
application accordingly leads to the question: Why has the
constitutional right seemingly affirmed by the Second Amendment
not enjoyed the benefit of incorporation? Indeed, ending the exile of
the Second Amendment to the district of unincorporated rights is as
much the object of the individual right interpretation as insisting upon
a particular account of the original understanding of 1787-91. It
would do no good to demonstrate conclusively that the framers and
ratifiers of those years really did regard a fundamental right to own
weapons as a necessary security against the danger of tyranny, if one
could not at the same time produce a compelling rationale for its
incorporation today.
There is, however, a third legacy of incorporation that also
shapes-or perhaps distorts-our historical understanding of the
nature of the right that the Second Amendment asserts. Given the
broad application of the incorporation doctrine to remedy injustice
and secure relief in decision after landmark decision, it is only natural
that we now regard the Bill of Rights as a set of legally enforceable
claims and commands. If a right is asserted, there must be a remedy
when its exercise is infringed, and a remedy requires recourse to law.
To have a right without a legally efficacious remedy is arguably to
have no right at all, and if that is so, it would seem rather naive and
pointless to think of a bill of rights (any bill of rights) as a set of
hollow principles. As invested as we are (legally) in the jurisprudence
147. See GLENDON, supra note 21, at 47.
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of the Bill of Rights and (culturally) in veneration of the wisdom of
the constitutional fathers, it is difficult to suggest that they could have
been so naive as to enumerate rights for which they did not intend
remedies.
Yet at the time when the Second Amendment was adopted, it
was still possible to conceive of statements of rights in quite different
terms, as assertions or confirmations of vital principles, rather than
the codification of legally enforceable restrictions or commands. The
state declarations of rights of 1776 were filled with statements of this
nature, and many of these statements-and arguably the bills of rights
in toto-lacked legal authority. A statement endorsing the principle
of rotation in office did not impose term limits on legislators; it simply
reminded voters that they would be well advised, from time to time,
to send the bumpkins back to the country. To be sure, it was
precisely because such statements had demonstrated their
"inefficacy" that Madison first dismissed bills of rights as so many
"parchment barriers," 148  and then proposed interweaving his
amendments in the most salient places in the Constitution, rather
than see them appended as supplemental articles. The movement
away from the norms of 1776 was also reflected in his congressional
colleagues' rejection of the formulaic restatement of natural rights
that Madison originally proposed as a sort of second preamble to the
Constitution, and which he revealingly classified as "a bill of rights," in
apparent contradistinction to his remaining, interwoven amend-
ments.149 Any comparison of the amendments of 1787 with the state
declarations will reveal how far American thinking had moved since
1776.
Yet among all the provisions of the federal Bill of Rights, the
Second Amendment is the one that most clearly echoes the earlier
tradition. That is the most obvious explanation for the mysterious
148. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in JAMES MADISON:
WRITINGS 418, 420 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
149. See James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June
8, 1789), in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS, supra note 148, at 437, 441, 444. In rejecting these
statements, Congress may have been acting on the same assumptions that Edmund Randolph
had voiced at the Constitutional Convention two years earlier, when, as a member of the
Committee of Detail, he noted that the national constitution need not come adorned with the
rhetorical flourishes that accompanied the state constitutions. Such a "display of theory,
howsoever proper in the first formation of state governments, is unfit here; since we are not
working on the natural rights of men not yet gathered into society, but upon those rights,
modified by society, and interwoven with what we call the rights of states." Edmund Randolph,
Draft Sketch of Constitution (July 26, 1787), in SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND'S THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 183, 183 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987).
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presence of the distinctive preamble that is the object of so much
analysis, from the syntactical to the metaphysical. As Eugene Volokh
has recently noted, the preamble is not quite so esoteric or
exceptional a statement as it is often made to appear. Set in the
larger context of Revolutionary-era pronouncements, it is almost
"commonplace."' 150 But intent as Volokh is on parsing the relation of
the preamble to the operative provision, he misses a more obvious
point that better captures or represents the context in which the
Second Amendment was formulated. What was still a commonplace
was the idea that a declaration of rights could contain statements of
republican principles as well as provisions confirming or specifying
natural rights (freedom of conscience), political safeguards (freedom
of speech, press, assembly, and petition), common law procedural
rights (Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eight Amendments), or superfluous
remedies against idiosyncratic grievances (such as quartering of
soldiers in peacetime).
Under this interpretation, the Second Amendment can be read
as a simple, elegant, distilled version of the comparable statements
found in the state declarations of rights and the amendments
recommended by several ratification conventions. It affirmed the
essential proposition-or commonplace-that liberty fared better
when republican polities relied upon a militia of citizens soldiers for
their defense, rather than risk the dire consequences of sustaining a
permanent military establishment. It therefore served as a principled
reminder to the federal government (or more particularly, Congress)
to act to insure that the militia would indeed remain well organized,
armed, and disciplined-not least by guaranteeing that arms be
provided to state governments and citizen soldiers who might
otherwise lack the resources and desire to obtain and maintain costly
firearms prone to disrepair. The Second Amendment, however, also
omitted more restrictive provisions that Antifederalists would have
liked or expected to find there, because the dominant Federalist
majority in Congress saw no need to make the text more explicit.
There was no need, for example, to repeat the ritual mantra against
standing armies, for Federalists had repeatedly insisted that the
constitutional restriction of appropriations to two years meant that a
true standing army-that is, a permanent military force existing
independently of control by the people's representatives-could
150. Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 793
(1998). Volokh conveniently provides an appendix of similarly styled articles. See id. at 814-21.
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literally not be created. One can speculate, too, that the Senate
deleted the substantive phrase, "composed of the body of the
people," for sheer redundancy, in an act (Amar suggests) of "stylistic
shortening." But a Congress that wanted to affirm a general principle
without compromising its own capacity (or that of future Congresses)
to decide what form the militia should take would have had more
potent reasons to eliminate that phrase. By the same token, while the
Second Amendment generally endorsed the value of a well-regulated
militia, as a mere statement of principle it made no alteration of any
kind in the delegation and allocation of legislative authority in
Article I.
It goes almost without saying that the statement of a general
principle may fall well short of the provision of adequate remedies for
its infringement. But that deficiency would have mattered to the
framers of the Second Amendment only insofar as they believed that
the Constitution posed a real threat requiring a remedy. They lacked
any incentive to move beyond the vague generalities of the language
they finally adopted, and with good reason not to do so if greater
precision could be read as imposing a meaningful restriction on the
ability of Congress to develop whatever form of militia considerations
of national security seemed to require.
Yet the brevity and ambiguity of the Second Amendment may
illuminate a deeper problem with the very conception of a bill of
rights. We may be reluctant to admit it, but the task of reducing the
statement of a right to a concise textual formula, in the style of the
national Constitution, suggests that the concept of a right may be far
more difficult to cabin successfully than other kinds of statements we
expect to find in a constitutional text. Stating a theory of freedom of
speech or conscience, for example, is not quite equivalent to
specifying modes of election or terms of office or even the respective
powers of institutions. The very concept of a right remains a source
of philosophical perplexity, and so, on occasion, does the
identification of the rights bearer, including the keeper and bearer of
arms. Is that right a duty we owe to the state or a manifestation of a
natural right of resistance and self-protection? Is the individual who
can claim to exercise a right to protect his home the same individual
who forms part of the people mobilized in the militia? Does it make
sense to speak of an individual right to arms in the context of a right
of revolution, which must be a collective act of mass resistance if it is
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not to devolve into an expression of anarcho-terrorism? 151
In his letter discussing the problem of bills of rights as
"parchment barriers," Madison casually mentioned the problem that
would arise if "a positive declaration of some of the most essential
rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude.115 2  His
particular example involved a right to which he was far more attached
than the right to bear arms: freedom of conscience. Madison worried
that this cherished right might have to be textually tailored more
narrowly than it should be in principle if it was to acquire the
requisite political support. But Madison's concern with the difficulty
of stating a right in a textually satisfactory way may illuminate a
deeper problem. What textual formula, expressed in the succinct
style that the American constitutional tradition initially favored,
could possibly capture and distill the matrix of principles and
concerns that underlie any conception of a right, while simultaneously
identifying the rights bearer, the interest to be protected, and the
point where that protection yields to legitimate demands for
regulation? Given the circumstances of 1789, when we cannot be
certain how seriously the framers of the Bill of Rights were taking
their assignment, it takes a high degree of confidence in their desire
to achieve "perspicuity" to conclude that the authors of the
amendments were acting with as much textual exactitude as we seek
to extract in our own labored readings of these twenty-seven words.
Somewhere up there, one suspects, Fisher Ames might still be
chuckling: "Oh! I had forgot, the right of the people to bear arms.
Risum teneatis amici[.]"153 Hold your laughter, friends! -except that
the subject is too deadly serious for that.
151. The leading scholar working on this issue is David Williams, who has argued in various
places that while the Second Amendment was framed to express or confirm a popular right of
revolution, that right is now obsolete because no unitary people of the kind imagined by the
theorists of the eighteenth century could ever again form. At the same time, Williams denies
that the Amendment recognizes a constitutionally protected private right of self-defense. For
Williams's various expositions of his ideas, see David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the
Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991); David C.
Williams, The Constitutional Right to "Conservative" Revolution, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
413 (1997); David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution:
Conjuring with the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879 (1996).
152. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 148, at 420.
153. Letter from Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight, supra note 12, at 642.
[Vol. 76:103
THE HIGHEST STAGE OF ORIGINALISM
CONCLUSION
Beneath their huzzas of conquest delivered on a field supposedly
cleared of beaten opponents, cowed into retreat by the exemplary
scholarship of the victors, the proponents of the individual right
interpretation betray the reason for the peculiar emphases and
distortions that mark their writings. Had there been any reason for
the constitutional disputants of the late 1780s to discuss, directly and
consciously, the extent of private rights of the ownership and use of
firearms, advocates of the individual right interpretation would
certainly have filled their articles with the apposite remarks. They
would not have had to pepper their quotations with the tell-tale
ellipses that invite critical readers to check what has been omitted (as
in the use made of The Federalist No. 46); or make preposterous
claims that are easily refuted (such as James Madison's supposed
endorsement of Tench Coxe's description of the right to bear arms as
a private right); or suggest that the deletion of a substantive
qualification of the nature of the militia ("composed of the body of
the people") was an inconsequential exercise in editorial concision; or
use one textual rule for defining people and another for militia. Had
the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution really perceived the
problem in terms of a private right detached from service in the
public institution of the militia, we would know it, and the writings of
Halbrook, Kates, Malcolm, and others would take a different form.
For ceteris paribus, direct expressions of framers' intentions and
ratifiers' understandings would always provide the best evidence of
the original meaning of a disputed constitutional clause.
But the structure of the debates of the late 1780s did not conduce
to pose the problem in the form that proponents of the individual
right interpretation would prefer to exploit. As the records from the
Constitutional Convention, the ensuing ratification campaign, and the
debates in the First Congress of 1789 all demonstrate, the issue under
discussion was always the militia, and that issue was posed primarily
as a matter of defining the respective powers of two levels of
government. It was the inertial condition of American federalism-
the existence of states with some intractable measure of autonomy,
including the militia, yet bound for collective security in a federal
union coeval with their independence -that ineluctably gave the
debate this form. This controlling circumstance, to be sure, did not
prevent odd expressions of concern about the private ownership and
use of weapons from being voiced, but it did prevent such concerns
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from reaching the threshold required for focused discussion, much
less becoming the true object of debate. Nor was there then any
reason to think of the ownership and use of firearms as a problem of
public health and welfare. Under conceptions prevailing then and
even now, such concerns fell completely under the conventional
police powers of the states, and nothing in the structure of debate
between 1787 and 1789 invited inquiry into the effect the Constitution
would have in this realm. The debate over a bill of rights, as everyone
knows, was about limiting the powers of the proposed national
government, not trenching further on the traditional police
responsibilities of the states. Similarly, because firearms had little
practical use in private life, and were hardly dangerous except in
warfare, it is completely anachronistic to expect the disputants of the
eighteenth century to have comprehended, much less addressed, the
problem of firearms regulation in its modern form. For much the
same reason, the framers and ratifiers of the Fifth Amendment did
not consider the problem of wiretapping or more sophisticated forms
of electronic surveillance; nor did they ask whether a Constitution
that allowed the national government to raise land and naval forces
would be embarrassed by the establishment of the United States Air
Force.
Given these difficulties, it is not surprising that the individual
right interpretation relies so much on the weight of received tradition,
in the form of warnings about the danger of standing armies, the
virtues of an armed citizenry, and what Joyce Malcolm disarmingly
calls "long-standing prejudice" or things that are "unmistakably
assumed.1154 Sir William Blackstone never visited America, nor was
he a member of the Constitutional Convention, but his works were
widely read, so it naturally follows that his speculative claim that an
armed people would be able "to restrain the violence of oppression"
provides the proverbial smoking pistol to solve the mystery of the
Second Amendment.155
All that this emphasis on received wisdom can establish or
confirm, however, is the familiar point that Americans feared
standing armies and hoped that the maintenance of a well regulated
militia would obviate the need for a substantial national military
establishment. This was indeed, to borrow Malcolm's phrase, a long-
standing prejudice, and it certainly left its mark on the grammar of
154. MALCOLM, supra note 25, at 148.
155. Id. at 163.
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eighteenth-century republicanism. But the authority of such prior
sentiments was exactly what the revolutionaries and constitutionalists
of the 1770s and 1780s were prepared to, and did, challenge. Long-
standing prejudice suggested that the British constitution was the
embodiment of the best political science of the era, but Americans
not only departed freely from its form and structure, they also
invented a new definition of what a constitution itself was to replace
the one they had inherited. The exercises of constitution-writing in
1776 and especially in 1787 were shaped within the crucible, the
hothouse experience, of revolution and revolutionary war, and some
of the lessons that experience taught bore directly on the subject at
hand: the role and value of either the militia as an organized
institution or of an armed citizenry whose private weapons proved to
be inadequate in number, quality, and repair. Not surprisingly, the
individual right interpretation passes in nearly complete silence over
the obvious question: Were Americans in the late 1780s thinking
about the militia in exactly the same unchanged terms as they had in
1776? Some of them admittedly were, but they were far more likely
to be numbered among the losers in the constitutional debates of
1787-89 than the victors. And that is why we can fairly conclude that
Madison had substantive reasons for omitting the phrase "composed
of the body of the people" from his original draft of the amendment;
why a Senate that included Rufus King, one of the committee
members who framed the Militia Clause at the Constitutional
Convention, would have deleted this phrase after the House had
added it; and why a conference committee that included Madison for
the House left that deletion unchallenged.
Finally, the complete omission from the individual right
interpretation of any discussion of the police power of the states
constitutes potentially its most telling flaw, while simultaneously
exposing a deeper dilemma in its dependence on originalism. If we
read the Constitution intratextually, how do we triangulate the echoes
between the people of the Second and Ninth Amendments, on the
one hand, and the reserved powers of the states under the Tenth
Amendment, on the other? Like the Second Amendment, the Tenth
Amendment takes the form of an ambiguously stated injunction
which arguably adds little if anything to the positive content of the
Constitution. Yet it is impossible to conceive how the Tenth
Amendment could have excluded the traditional power of
government to legislate broadly for public health and safety from the
reserved powers of the states. It is precisely because this traditional
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function was (and remains) so essential to our concept of governance
that the individual right interpretation has to insist that the principal
purpose of the Second Amendment is to provide a powerful deterrent
against tyranny. Only by evoking that speculative threat to the
republic itself can the individual right interpretation identify a danger
more ominous than the actual costs annually incurred through the
casual and deliberate use of firearms.
If, then, one wished to adjudicate the Second Amendment
dispute on originalist grounds, it would not be enough to adduce a
historically delimited meaning of the word militia and the existence of
a right of resistance and revolution that would be rendered
meaningless if the population were disarmed. One would also have to
ask whether the adopters of the Second Amendment thought or
understood that they were seriously restricting the normal police
powers of the state in order to preserve that revolutionary option.
Even putting aside the formidable problems that this Article has
emphasized in the individual right interpreters' use of originalist
evidence, their arguments would still need to confront a completely
different line of originalist argument- anchored in the Tenth
Amendment-that they have so far largely ignored. One originalist
argument holds that the danger of tyranny still warrants a broad
construction of the Second Amendment, and that the right to be
armed must therefore vest in the population as a whole, because the
modern militia (the National Guard) is already too closely tied to the
potential source of despotism to act the part that Madison and others
of his generation accorded to the state-based militia of their era. The
other argument holds that the Constitution, amended or unamended,
did not diminish the capacity of the states to legislate in pursuit of the
public health and safety. What has changed over time is not our basic
understanding of the responsibility of state governance in this respect,
other shifts in the balance of state and federal activity
notwithstanding, but rather our appreciation of the danger that casual
use of firearms poses.
The true way, then, in which the Second Amendment problem
(as an exercise in originalism) should be cast is this: If its adopters had
the same evidence available to them that we possess today, would
they place greater weight on the speculative danger of tyranny,
rooted in their reconstruction of the history of early modern Europe
and their fear of consolidated power? Or would they agree that
pressing problems of the present warrant placing greater emphasis on
the police powers of the states? Either position can be argued on
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originalist grounds, but posing the problem in this way identifies a
deeper irony in the larger debate. For at bottom, the individual right
interpretation insists that fears rooted in the historical memories of
the eighteenth century should still take priority over the judgments
we are entitled to reach after two centuries of constitutional self-
government.15 6  Those fears were certainly legitimate then, for the
founders of American constitutionalism had good reason and
historical evidence aplenty to wonder whether their experiment
would work. That is what makes their leap of constitutional faith so
compelling and their fears of standing armies and national despotism
so understandable.
But is it true that the success of American constitutionalism two
centuries and more later is due to the existence of a well-armed
citizenry? We have been told that the decline of bowling leagues may
be an index of the well-being of democratic civil society, but does it
follow that the welfare of constitutional governance is directly
correlated with the distribution of portable weapons, up to and
including the automatic weapons that occasionally figure in
schoolyard shootings?'57 Somehow I have naively labored under the
impression that the strength of our constitutional culture lies
elsewhere, in the commitment of our citizenry to principles of
representative government, equality, and (increasingly) tolerance; but
156. On this point, supporters of the individual right interpretation would argue that our
own frame of reference should include the experience of totalitarian rule and genocide in
countries like Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and other horror stories of the past century; and
that is, of course, a telling argument. But so is the appropriate response: that none of these
countries had developed a democratic or constitutional culture, or established institutions and
conventions of republican government, supported and shared by citizens and ruling elites alike,
across a period of some generations, while successfully acculturating immigrants whose own
origins were often not rooted in similarly democratic cultures. See the discussion of this point in
Reynolds, supra note 48, at 504-07, and sources cited therein.
157. I am not completely reassured by the explanation on this point offered by Glenn
Harlan Reynolds:
Because one purpose of the right is to allow individuals to form up into militia units at
a moment's notice, the kinds of weapons protected are those in general military use, or
those that, though designed for civilians, are substantially equivalent to those military
weapons. Because another purpose is the defense of the home, Standard Model
writers also import common-law limitations on the right to arms, as they existed at the
time of the framing. Under the common law, individuals had a right to keep and bear
arms, but not such arms as were inherently a menace to neighbors, or that had an
unavoidable tendency to terrify the community. Thus, weapons such as machine guns,
howitzers, or nuclear weapons would not be permitted. Note however that the
much-vilified "assault rifle" would be protected under this interpretation-not in spite
of its military character, but because of it.
Id. at 479-80. In some ways, I think I would be more terrified of an AK-47 next door than a
howitzer, on the assumption that whatever target the howitzer hit would be some miles distant,
while a neighbor fending off a burglar with a full automatic burst could easily put an alarming
number of rounds into my own little (and regrettably unfortified) castle.
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after this disconcerting journey to the Second Amendment theater,
my confidence has been shaken.
